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ABSTRACT
Environmental justice organizations across the country are
pursuing redress for disproportionate exposure to environ-
mental harm. While most of the litigation pursued in the
name of environmental justice has not resulted in legal reme-
dies, the secondary effects of these legal efforts have not been
given sufficient attention. A cross-sectional approach, which
holds the context in which organizations pursue litigation
constant while scrutinizing whether legal remedies have been
achieved, is quite common in the environmental justice litera-
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ture. Such an approach ignores the unique characteristics of
community organizations that influence their ability to adapt
to complex decision-making environments. These character-
istics, which include membership, problem definition, and
resource constraints, shape the long-run strategies pursued by
organizations and not their immediate success or failure in
court. The case of West Dallas Coalition for Environmental
Justice v. EPA illustrates an "increasing returns process,"
whereby the Coalition persisted in relying on a legal strategy
that was perceived as sub-optimal from the standpoint of its
members and local residents.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case study seeks to explain why environmental justice orga-
nizations pursue legal remedies even when pursuit of legal claims
continually fails to meet primary organizational objectives. We
rely on analytic narrative, the modeling of processes that explain
outcomes through the building of complex stories, for our explana-
tion of this phenomenon. Specifically, this research traces the use
of a litigation strategy used by the West Dallas Coalition for Envi-
ronmental Justice, identifying "the actors, the decision points they
faced, the choices they made, the paths taken and shunned, and the
manner in which their choices generated events and outcomes."'
Previous accounts of environmental justice litigation, focusing pri-
marily on legal outcomes, have painted a sobering picture. In ref-
erence to the predominant legal strategy of the day, one
commentator concluded that "[b]y 1998 no one had yet succeeded
in bringing, and winning, a substantive Title VI environmental jus-
tice case in court."' 2 Yet, litigation remains a strategy of choice for
many environmental justice groups.
Legal scholars continue to search for a cause of action that will
remedy the disproportionate environmental harm suffered by com-
munities of color. Other legal experts acknowledge that focusing
on legal strategies alone can obscure the nexus between litigation
and the long-term effectiveness of communities organized in oppo-
sition to undesirable land uses. We offer an alternative approach
ROBERT H. BATES ET AL., ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 13-14 (1998).
2 CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
58 (1998).
3 See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need
for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 667-678 (1992) [hereinafter
Empowerment] ("While our first instinct as lawyers might be to use legal tactics, they may
not achieve the results our clients desire ... Even if we pursue a legal strategy, we must be
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by shifting the unit of analysis from legal causes of action to the
internal dynamics of community organizations that seek legal rem-
edies to address distributional inequities or a lack of procedural
access to environmental decision-making.' This shift in focus high-
lights the secondary effects of litigation. Sifting through the com-
plexities of the social, legal, scientific, and other secondary effects
of litigation requires a deep understanding of the organizations
involved and their propensity to adapt to the changes that accom-
pany the choice of a legal strategy. More pointedly, we argue that
the secondary effects of environmental justice litigation can only be
understood in light of an organization's ability to make sense of the
complex decision-making environments in which it functions.
Organizations are "groups of individuals bound by some com-
mon purpose to achieve objectives." 5 They provide stable social
relations that can reduce the transaction costs associated with
uncertain environments. A distinction can be drawn between
"groups, institutions, laws, population characteristics, and sets of
social relations that form the environment" and the "internal life"
of organizations.6 The social structure, or environment in which an
orgahization is formed, conditions the motivations of individuals to
organize. The environment also affects the internal choices availa-
ble to existing organizations. Thus, organizations can be viewed as
a series of created and evolving constraints imposed on individual
and group choice in return for the establishment of stable struc-
tures for human interaction. Given the interactive relationship
between organizations and their environments, it is surprising that
aware of its strategic potential for organizing and educating our client communities as well
as the general public. And we must be sensitive to a legal strategy's potential to dis-
empower our clients").
4 The Principles of Environmental Justice (hereinafter "The Principles"), adopted in
1991, reflect three interpretations of justice, embodying the notions of distributive fairness,
procedural access, and ecological sustainability. Much of the environmental justice move-
ment and literature appears focused on the "fair share" allocation of locally undesirable
land uses (such as landfills, incinerators, and hazardous waste facilities) among communi-
ties composed of predominantly minority and low socio-economic status individuals. The
Principles also demand the right to "participate as equal partners at every level of decision-
making, including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement, and evalua-
tion," and calls for steps to be taken to address the production processes responsible for
the generation of environmental risk. Principles of Environmental Justice, in Proc. of the
1991 First Nat'l People of Color Envtl. Leadership Summit xiii-xiv (United Church of
Christ Commission for Racial Justice 1991).
5 DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 5 (1990).
6 Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF ORGA-
NIZATIONS 142 (James G. March ed., 1965).
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environmental justice litigation research centers on substantive
legal claims and not the impact of the legal claims on the organiza-
tions and communities that pursue them.
Thus far, environmental justice litigation research has focused on
three primary categories of legislation: the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution,7 Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 and traditional environmental
law (environmental statutes that were not enacted to address civil
rights concerns per se, including the National Environmental Policy
Act). 9 Cases in all three categories are typically scrutinized to
7 U.S. Const. amend XIV, §1; In Washington v. Davis the Supreme Court stated that the
Equal Protection Clause is intended to prevent "official misconduct discriminating on the
basis of race." 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Following Washington, plaintiffs claiming equal
protection violations were forced to establish that race was the motivating factor in a siting
decision and that a decision was made because of its adverse effect on a racial minority
group (this practice is known as racial animus). In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp., the Court held that the denial of rezoning for a racially integrated
housing project did not prove an intent to discriminate. 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977). Most
cases that assert equal protection claims fail to afford a legal remedy, despite the courts'
recognition that local residents face the discriminatory impacts of land use decisions. For
instance, in R.I.S.E., IMc. v. Kay, plaintiffs challenged a decision by county officials to allow
a regional landfill to be located in a predominantly black community. 768 F. Supp. 1144,
1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991). Three existing landfills in the county were located in ninety to
one hundred percent black communities. The court ruled that even though the landfills
disproportionately impacted African-Americans, the plaintiffs did not satisfy 'the remain-
der of the discriminatory purpose equation set forth in Arlington Heights. Id. at 1148-49.
8 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that "no person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000d (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp.
1995). Environmental justice cases can be filed under the regulations implementing Title
VI or under the statute itself. The benefit of filing under the regulations of federal agen-
cies (such as the EPA) lies in the differences in the burden of proof. When suits are
brought under federal agency regulations under Section 602 of Title VI, claims are allowed
based on proof of unjustified disparate impact. Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private
Cause of Action Under EPA'sTitle VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental
Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12 (1999). Otherwise, discriminatory intent is
required (under Section 601). Id. There is a three-factor test for a private right of action
under Section 602: whether the agency rule is within the scope of the enabling statute,
whether the statute intended a private right of action, and whether a private right of action
will further the statute's intentions. Id. at 5. Remedies available under Title VI include
declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief (forcing a redistribution of harms), although
damages are only provided upon the showing of discriminatory intent. Steven A. Light &
Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VI a Magic Bullet? Environmental Racism in the Context of
Political-Economnic Processes and Imperatives, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 25-26 (1996).
9 See Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism: Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 307 (1995). Much of the environmental justice movement's
momentum gained from litigation has come through efforts to uphold environmental stat-
utes without reference to civil rights violations. At times these efforts have been coupled
with personal injury complaints. The first major case to couple environmental and civil
2001] Secondary Effect of Environmental Justice Litigation 435
determine whether or not they have achieved legal remedies (i.e.,
"the means employed to enforce or redress an injury.")"1 An
examination of relevant decisions reveals that, with the exception
of a negotiated settlement,' I the incorporation of civil rights con-
cerns (i.e., distributive fairness) with claims of environmental harm
has failed to provide a legal remedy to address alleged environ-
mental injustices (Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix A).' 2 Cases that seek
redress for violations of environmental statutes, particularly those
concerning procedural violations, have proven more successful at
addressing civil rights concerns. 13 However, the legal remedies
rights, Keith v. Volpe, concerned the construction of the Century Freeway in Los Angeles
and its displacement of minority and low-income persons. 858 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir.
1988). A preliminary injunction was issued on grounds of procedural violations of NEPA,
while 14th Amendment claims were not met (parties entered into a consent decree over
construction and relocation). Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 470, 482-86 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 813 (1989).
10 STEVEN H. GIns LAW DICTIONARY 430 (4th ed. 1996).
"1 Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 533 (1994) [hereinafter Environmental Justice Litigation].
12 But see South Camden Citizens in Action v. N. J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 01-702
(N.J. 2001). On 20 April 2001 a federal district court judge granted Plaintiff's application
for preliminary injunction of the St. Lawrence Cement Company's operation of a blast
furnace slag processing facility. The proposed facility would have emitted particulates,
lead, mercury, and other toxics into the air and generated approximately 77,000 additional
truck deliveries in an impoverished neighborhood in South Camden (91% people of color).
The case has been remanded to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
which is asked to make findings consistent with the Opinion. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court recently limited the kind of private suits that can be brought under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to enforce a ban on discrimination in programs that receive federal money. In
a 5 to 4 decision, the Court ruled that suits can only be brought for intentional discrimina-
tion on the basis of race and not over plans or policies that have a discriminatory impact.
The law at issue was Title VI. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
13 Environmental justice victories through use of traditional environmental law include
Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin 428 F.2d 1093, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (brought on
behalf of six women attempting to ban DDT); El Pueblo Para El Aire y Agua Limpio v.
County of Kings, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20357, 20358 (Super. Ct. 1991) (chal-
lenging the siting of a toxic waste incinerator on grounds that Spanish-speaking residents
of a 95% Latino city were excluded from the Environmental Impact Report ("EIR") pro-
cess, although ultimately the court found that inadequacies in the analysis not the readabil-
ity of the text constituted the significant deficiency of the Final Subsequent EIR); Blue
Legs v. EPA, 668 F.Supp. 1329, 1342 (D. S.D. 1987) (challenging, on behalf of Native
American residents, the disposal of waste through the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act); and Horn v. City of Birmingham, 718 So.2d 694, 706-7 (1998) (discussing a prede-
cessor case halting issuance of construction permits for a sanitary waste transfer station
until council approval obtained through proper notice and hearing). Numerous cases,
however, have been dismissed or their claims have been denied on procedural grounds or
questions of standing. New River Valley Greens v. USDOT, No. 95-1203-R (W.D. Va.
1996), affd, No. 97-1978 (4th Cir. 1998) (FEIS was not arbitrary and capricious); West
Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice v. United States, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20420, , (N.D. Tex. 1998), (dismissing without prejudice plaintiff's suit for failure to meet
the 60-day notice requirement of RCRA's citizen suite provision); Morongo Band of Mis-
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often only require the simple reissuance of environmental impact
assessments with appropriate notice and comment periods.
Title VI claims remain limited in terms of their reach, inclusive-
ness, and practicality. As to reach, Title VI only establishes non-
discrimination requirements for federally-funded programs.14
Inclusiveness is limited due to standing requirements. In making
standing decisions, courts have applied three different standards:
(1) whether the plaintiffs are intended beneficiaries of the feder-
ally-funded program, (2) whether plaintiffs can prove harm, and
(3) whether the discrimination will injure the intended benefi-
ciaries.' 5 Practicality is diminished because Title VI lawsuits are
expensive, and plaintiffs often lack sufficient resources to conduct
a thorough investigation. 16 In addition, the Title VI cases outlined
in Table 3 (Appendix A) consumed as much as a decade's worth of
court time and resources. Equal Protection cases have been all but
abandoned due to the unreasonably high standard of proof of
racial animus.
The cross-sectional approach to evaluating environmental justice
litigation, which ignores the political and organizational environ-
ment in which these cases proceed, begs the question, why do com-
munity organizations continue to rely on litigation even when this
strategy appears, at least from the outside, to be ineffective? This
approach' 7 lies in marked contrast to attempts by historical institu-
sion Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d. 569, 583 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that decision to allow
airport extension was not arbitrary and capricious under NEPA); Ecological Rights Found.
v. Pacific Lumber Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that members of
environmental organizations did not have standing to assert violation of Clean Water Act);
and Mt. Lookout-Mt. Nebo Prop. Prot. Ass'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 143 F.3d
165, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission con-
sidered and addressed all of the Association's points in regard to the construction of a
hydroelectric power generation plant).
14 James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL; L.J. 125, 156 (1994).
15 Id. at 166.
16 Id. at 127.
17 Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 829 (1993). While it is noted that "[tihe
mere filing of a formal complaint provides a very powerful and visible statement by minori-
ties regarding their belief that distributional inequities exist" and that "[tlhe publicity that
frequently surrounds the complaint's filing enhances public awareness of these concerns,"
the conclusion that "virtually none of those suits has been successful" conforms to the
notion that "success" can be measured in terms of whether particular legal doctrines such
as equal protection are hospitable to environmental justice claims. Id. Such a definition
privileges the legal structure (framework) in which environmental justice suits are assessed,
and relegates the agents of environmental justice organizations to the status of interested
bystanders. See also Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism" and Locally Undesirable
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tionalists to make sense of the origins of institutions (such as com-
munity organizations) and their interactions with their socio-
political settings. Rather than determining which factors produce
political or legal outcomes at a given moment,"8 historical institu-
tionalism seeks to reinsert these factors in their temporal context.
Only through an understanding of historical context can we draw
conclusions about the organizational characteristics and constraints
that mediate legal and policy outcomes. 19 Pursuant to this
approach, a more suitable question regarding "environmental jus-
tice litigation would concern the characteristics of organizations
and their decision-making environments that encourage continued
reliance on a potentially sub-optimal course of action.
Shifting the attention of environmental justice litigants to the
context in which legal claims are made has important conse-
quences. First, the direct impact of a legal claim (i.e., a legal rem-
edy such as injunctive relief) may be less important than the
indirect or secondary effects that litigation can have on a commu-
nity organization."' Lawsuits can be opportunities for the victims
of environmental injustice to "join together, outside of the formal
boundaries of the litigation. . .to engage among themselves in
reflective conversation and strategic action."'1  Lawsuits are also
complex undertakings, capable of shedding new light on the root
causes of environmental injustice through collaborations between
Land Uses: A Critique of Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 8 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 121, 145-58 (1997).
l This methodological approach and way of thinking about social processes has been
referred to as "general linear reality," (GLR) which assumes that fixed entities have attrib-
utes that interact to create outcomes, which cannot depend on an entity's contextual loca-
tion. Andrew A. Abbott, Transcending General Linear Reality, 6 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
169, 170 (1988). GLR is contrasted with major theoretical traditions in sociology in terms
of how they approach causality. Id. at 171. Whereas GLR focuses on the changing attrib-
utes of fixed entities, sociology often starts with an historical narrative organized around a
central subject, which "includes or endures a number of events, which may be large or
small, directly relevant or tangential, specific or vague." Id. Sociologists such as Max
Weber present complex stories in order to approach social causality, rather than through
the use of variable attributes. Id.
19 G. John Ikenberry, History's Heavy Hand: Institutions and the Politics of the State
(1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Environmental Law Journal).
20 ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 29
(1997). Three broad categories of secondary effects of litigation are offered by Cole: the
education of clients, policymakers, and the public; the drawing of members of a given com-
munity into social networks; and the addressing of root causes (economic and political)
rather than symptoms (such as discrete environmental harm). Empowerment, supra note 3
at 668.
21 Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit. Making Space for Clients
to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 545-6 (1987).
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legal plaintiffs and local residents. The setting in which environ-
mental justice groups exist can either facilitate the articulation of
an organization's mission or heighten the isolation and dependency
of poor people through adversarial decision-making. 22 The range
of potential secondary impacts of environmental litigation is signif-
icantly broader than the primary legal outcomes on which much of
the literature is focused.
A. Litigation and Increasing Returns
The context in which a legal strategy is adopted unfolds over
time. Community organizations may be at different stages of
development, an undesirable land use may be at the start or near-
ing the end of an environmental permitting process, or an impor-
tant election may have shifted the focus of a city council vis-A-vis a
group's claims of environmental harm. One must make sense of
these and a multitude of other factors when litigation is analyzed.
Recent work in political science and sociology suggests a means of
carrying out such an analysis. A number of historical sociologists
in particular have argued that many social phenomena can be
explained in terms of increasing returns. 23 Based in part on the
literature on economics and technology,24 arguments about
increasing returns were developed in response to the assumption of
negative feedback in conventional economic theory. In neoclassi-
cal theory, economic actions result in negative feedback, such as
when high oil prices encourage energy conservation, which in turn
precipitates a drop in oil prices. Negative feedback is viewed as a
stabilizing force in the economy, as such reactions offset major eco-
nomic changes. In many parts of the economy, however, the stabi-
22 See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PRO-
GRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 23-28 (1992).
23 James Mahoney, Uses of Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association at 3 (Sept. 2, 1999) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Virginia Environmental Law Journal). See also Kathleen Thelen, Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV. OF POL. Scl. 369, 387-388 (1999)
(Political development is constrained by crucial moments of institutional formation, and
responses to changing environmental conditions are limited by past trajectories. A weak-
ness of the literature is also discussed: the mechanisms through which critical junctures are
translated into lasting trajectories have not been clearly specified).
24 For example, Arthur suggests that certain technologies can achieve an initial advan-
tage over alternative technologies even if the latter would, in the long run, prove to be
more efficient. W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in
by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 126 (1989). The most oft-cited example concerns the
"QWERTY" keyboard, and its dominance over the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (DSK)
even though DSK allowed for faster typing. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of
QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985).
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lizing forces of negative feedback do not operate. Particularly in
knowledge-based sectors, positive feedback magnifies the effects of
small shifts, allowing for many possible equilibrium points. For
products such as computers, software, and fiber optics, large initial
investments in knowledge production are required, compared with
relatively cheap incremental production costs, which decrease with
increasing familiarity with related processes. In addition to falling
production costs, rising consumer benefits in the form of network-
ing and compatibility requirements further lock-in the effects of
small economic shifts, such as an initially small gain in market
share. Through such mechanisms, "[i]nitial moves in a particular
direction encourage further movement along the same path," and
alternatives not chosen become increasingly unreachable.
Many social processes, including the choice of a litigation strat-
egy by a community organization, may also be prone to increasing-
returns due to institutional characteristics and the "imperfect mar-
ket conditions" in which they unfold.26 The choices facing a com-
munity organization that has to decide how best to proceed with an
environmental justice claim are unstable and complex. It is impos-
sible at first for such organizations to determine which strategies,
such as litigation, protest, or political mobilization (or a combina-
tion) will be most effective in meeting its objectives. Advocates
educate themselves by observing the successes and failures of pre-
vious strategies in a form of trial-and-error learning.27 Information
is incomplete at best, or purposefully withheld or presented in an
inappropriate format to community representatives by government
officials.28 In the context of these and other constraints, positive
feedback is likely to occur following organizational choice among
25 Paul Pierson, Not Just What, But When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative
Politics, 14 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 72, 74 (2000).
26 Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INST. AND THEORET-
ICAL ECON. 11, 17 (1993).
27 Diane Schwartz, Environmental Racism: Using Legal and Social Means to Achieve
Environmental Justice, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 409, 432 (1997).
28 In one case, the siting of a toxic waste incinerator was challenged when a county
published an environmental impact.report in English, despite the 95% Latino, 40% monol-
ingual demographics of the city in which it was to be sited. Environmental Justice Litiga-
tion, supra note 11 at 529 (citing El Pueblo Para El Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of
Kings, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Super. Ct. 1991)). The judge overturned
county approval of the incinerator, ruling that lack of a Spanish translation violated the
California Environmental Quality Act. Id. at 530.
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competing strategies, due to the following characteristics of organi-
zations and their choice environments. 29 :
Large fixed costs: When the costs associated with a decision are
high (in terms of resources such as time or opportunity costs
invested or foregone), there is a strong incentive to stick with an
option once it has been chosen.
Learning effects: Within a complex environment, knowledge
gained through adherence to a particular strategy will lead to
higher returns from continued use. Repetitive use of a strategy will
enable organizational members to follow the strategy more effec-
tively. Actors operating within complex environments will form
"mental maps," through which they filter information. Informa-
tion that confirms an actor's mental map will likely be incorpo-
rated. Disconfirming information is filtered.3"
Coordination effects: As a greater proportion of an organiza-
tion's membership adapts to the same strategy, the benefits that an
individual receives from conforming to similar activities increases.
For community organizations, the choice of a strategy must be
linked to an infrastructure of individual and group behavior that is
compatible with the objectives of a chosen strategy. Once the daily
routines of individuals are patterned around the strategy, it
becomes difficult for others to initiate activities that cannot be sup-
ported by the existing infrastructure.
Adaptive expectations: Members of a community organization
will place certain expectations on each possible strategy adopted by
the group. Individuals will choose and adapt to a particular strat-
egy in order to realize projected future benefits associated with
that decision.
These and other potential sources of positive feedback condition
the trajectories followed by organizations once they act. Increasing
returns that result from the above conditions can take the form of
real, perceived, or expected benefits, such as the procurement of
collective goods (i.e., group legitimacy, the removal of negative
29 These characteristics are described in W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND
PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 112 (1994); Paul Pierson, Path Dependence,
Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics 9-10 (October 15, 1999) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Virginia Environmental Law Journal).
30 Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Insti-
tutions, 47 KYKLOS 3, 15-16 (1994).
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externalities, or group coherence) or private goods (i.e., individual
economic gain or improvements to personal property or health).
By analyzing environmental justice litigation as it unfolds within
its socio-political context, the potential for the strategic choice of
litigation to encourage increasing returns within community orga-
nizations can be used to make sense of the broad range of secon-
dary effects stemming from a legal claim. Informal community
organizations are subject to positive feedback in their decision-
making, which would suggest that comparatively broad choice sets
at the outset would become more constrained as reinforcement
occurs. More importantly, the mechanisms of self-reinforcement
that condition the movement of an organization along a chosen tra-
jectory can be used to predict the effects of an environmental jus-
tice strategy across a range of seemingly disparate cases. This is
due to the similarities in organizational structure and similar means
of reproducing a functional alternative once a legal strategy is
adopted by various community organizations. While it is impossi-
ble under conditions of increasing returns to know in advance
which of multiple equilibria will emerge following organizational
choice, it is possible to study the probability that certain outcomes
will emerge given a set of initial conditions within an organization
and its decision-making environment.
II. METHODOLOGY
The present research builds a narrative around the decision to
adopt a legal strategy by the West Dallas Coalition for Environ-
mental Justice, an informal organization started in 1989. The Coali-
tion was selected for analysis with the following criteria in mind:
organizational focus on environmental and civil rights concerns
from its inception, organizational activity before, during, and fol-
lowing the filing and adjudication of legal claims, and sufficient
access to organizational decision makers and documentation of
legal case history, public documents, media accounts, and organiza-
tional records. This information allowed us to assess the effects of
strategic choices on organizational form, function, and perform-
ance. As we will learn, each of these criteria were met by the Coa-
lition and generalizability of the Coalition's situation to other
environmental justice organizations makes it an appropriate sub-
ject for study as well.
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Narrative construction followed standard case study protocol
developed by Yin.31
Semi-structured interviews of organizational and community
members, city and state government officials, Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) officials, and legal representatives (twenty
interviews were conducted each lasting between one and one and a
half hours) were conducted between January and May, 2000. Inter-
viewees were questioned about their involvement, interests, and
perceptions of the Coalition (its structure and objectives) and the
environment in which it functioned. Archival data included media
accounts (1989-2000), West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Jus-
tice v. EPA case files (1991-1999), EPA documents pertaining to
the West Dallas Superfund site (1993-1999), Coalition files (1989-
1999), and city council and planning agency records for specific
decisions. Data reduction in the form of transcription and analytic
coding was used to extract evidence of organizational structure,
strategies, behavior, and internal dynamics, in addition to the sec-
ondary effects of its litigation strategy. Analytic coding involves
the assignment of labels to segments of text that represent similar
phenomena, such as acts, meanings, relationships, and settings. 32
Triangulation (between primary organizational/governmental and
secondary sources containing similar data) was used where possible
to ensure the accuracy of the data. The resulting analytic narrative
is presented below. Excerpts from interviews are included to
exemplify common themes.
III. FINDINGS
A. Historical conditions.
The West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice (WDCEJ)
arose in a complex community characterized by haphazard zoning
controls33 and multiple sources of potential exposure to toxicants.
Reports issued in the early 1990s documented 93 existing or closed
facilities responsible for the release of lead, arsenic, cadmium, and
31 ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (2d ed. 1994).
32 MATTHEW B. MILES & A. MICHAEL HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 56-
61 (2d ed. 1994).
33 The most recent comprehensive land use study of West Dallas describes the area as
"primarily zoned single family with community serving retail and industrial zoned parcels
scattered throughout." ClTY OF DALLAS, WEST DALLAS COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE
STUDY 3-1 (May 26, 1999).
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a host of other chemicals into the surrounding environment.34
Many of these facilities, all of which were located within an 11
square mile area known as West Dallas, had been cited for numer-
ous wastewater, emissions, and permit violations spanning
decades.3 5 Reports of chemical spills, deposits in unlined ditches,
and leakages from storage'vessels were also common. 36
One facility, a lead smelter owned by the RSR Corporation,
began operations in the early 1930's before West Dallas was
annexed by the city.37 Throughout the ensuing four decades, the
plant emitted as much as 260 tons of lead particles per year into the
West Dallas air.38 In anticipation of the annexation of West Dallas,
which was a predominantly African-American settlement, the Dal-
las Housing Authority constructed a 3,500 unit public housing pro-
ject mere feet from the smelting plant, on contaminated land, and
within the direction of prevailing winds. 39 Despite passage of a lead
emissions ordinance in 1968 and the publication of federally com-
missioned studies indicating a 36% increase in blood lead levels
and soil levels up to 99 times higher than those considered danger-
ous for residents living close to the plant, little action was taken by
the city of Dallas to enforce existing environmental laws until the
mid-1980's. 4 1 In 1983, the State of Texas and the City sued RSR
Corporation seeking a reduction in airborne emissions and clean-
up of the surrounding areas. 4' The settlement included soil
remediation in West Dallas, a blood-testing program for children
and pregnant women, and the installation of antipollution equip-
ment (which was never installed). 42 Between 1984 and 1985, the
34 Joyce S. Tsuji, U.S. Dep't of Justice, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF EVALUATION OF
HEALTH ISSUES FOR THE WEST DALLAS AREA DALLAS, TEXAS (Sept. 2, 1993); Ellen K.
Silbergeld, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Report to the Court in
re: Walker et al. v. HUD et al. (June 23, 1993) by Ellen K. Silbergeld, PhD.
35 Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 52, Walker v. HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Tex. 1989)
(No. 3:85-CV-1210-R).
36 Id.
37 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RSR CORPORATION
SUPERFUND SITE PROPOSED PLAN: OPERABLE UNIT 1 3 (Nov. 18, 1994) [hereinafter PRO-
POSED PLAN: OPERABLE UNIT 1].
38 Ronald Robinson, West Dallas Versus the Lead Smelter, IN Unequal Protection: Envi-
ronmental Justice and Communities of Color 93-94 (1994).
39 Id. at 99-100.
40 In the mid-1980's, the standard above which soil lead levels were considered unsafe
was 1,000 parts per million. Proposed Plan: Operable Unit 1, supra note 37 at 3. The
highest level detected in a residential area of West Dallas was for soil collected at the
driveway of Alicia Hracheta, tested at 99,000 parts per million. Robinson, supra note 39 at
98.
41 ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE 50 (2d ed. 1994).
42 Id.
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted a soil
remediation program within a one-half mile area north of the
smelter.43 Soon thereafter, RSR/Murph Metals was sold to Mur-
mur Corporation, the City did not renew the operating permit and
the smelter ceased its primary operations. 44
The RSR facility did not lead directly to the formation of the
WDCEJ. A community organizer who assisted with the group's
operations describes the incentives for organization as follows:
[I]t was to bring attention to what they thought was the den-
sity of environmentally undesirable facilities being congre-
gated right next to them and throughout their community
and to bring awareness to that and maybe some change to
that situation. To get people out of there, to address the
environmental health issue, and that has never been done.
To address the kind of incomplete cleanup of RSR, although
that wasn't immediately a priority. It was so after a while
obviously.45
WDCEJ members describe similar sets of objectives that devel-
oped during the group's inception, although these preferences were
ordered differently by residents who joined the Coalition.
It's more than lead. They had two or three different tox-
ics out here, maybe four. Had a cement plant, they had the
fertilizer plant, and then this roofing plant up here. Well,
they had three or four different things out here that really
don't need to be out here.46
Well, what was mainly the reason was that we were trying
for them to move us out of here, buy us out. Because we
knew that the land was contaminated. [WDCEJ] was also
trying to get that smelter knocked down, the projects
knocked down.47
What [WDCEJ] was trying for the city or the EPA to just
get us out of here, you know. Move us somewhere else
where it's good and healthy. That was part of the deal. If
they could not relocate us, we wanted damages because of
the contamination. . .to take care of the sick people, you
43 PROPOSED PLAN: OPERABLE UNIT ], supra note 38 at 3.
44Id.
45 Telephone Interview with Community Organizer, West Dallas Coalition for Environ-
mental Justice (Jan. 20, 2000) (emphasis added).
46 Interview with Deacon Moore, Member, West Dallas Coalition for Environmental
Justice, in Dallas, Tex. (Jan. 7, 2000).
47 Interview with Mary Nunez, Member, west Dallas Coalition for Environmental Jus-
tice, in Dallas, Tex. (Jan. 6, 2000).
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know. For the EPA to take care of the medical part, also to
clean up everything, like houses that are contaminated.48
In addition to preferences that were differently ordered and
were often vaguely defined, WDCEJ experienced fluid participa-
tion and severe resource constraints from its inception in 1989.
President Luis Sepulveda describes some of the Coalition's
problems of governance:
We don't [keep track of our members]. That's the bad thing
about it, because we have no budget. Since we don't have
any budget. We put out one newsletter, I think everybody
in the Coalition was thrilled that we had a newsletter but
that was funded by the church. We were able to use a xerox
machine to get a lot of those copies done. We were able to
use a lot of the money, they gave us $2,500, we were able to
buy a lot of paper so we could get copies to the community
for free. So we were able to do it as just a one-time deal.
We started taking minutes for a while but we were having
a lot of problems with writing abilities. And I didn't want to
be a president and writing and I didn't want to have the vice
president and her writing. But I think everybody that's been
a member can pretty well remember just about everything
that we've done.4 9
The West Dallas Toxic Times, issued in April, 1992, marked the
only formal communication between Coalition leaders and resi-
dent-members." Before and following its publication, residents
relied on informal social networks, handwritten fliers, and the local
media to maintain ties to the organization. Membership fluctuated
drastically, from estimates of between thirty and several thousand
from 1989 to 1999.51
West Dallas residents joined the Coalition seeking, as President
Sepulveda explained, "to find out what the problem was," a pro-
cess that by his estimation "almost took seven years. ' 52 The prob-
lem, as characterized by group leaders, concerned the cumulative
impacts of industrial and commercial land uses within West Dallas
48 Interview with Alex Hernandez, Member, West Dallas Coalition for Environmental
Justice, in Dallas, Tex. (Jan. 6, 2000).
49 Interview with Luis Sepulveda, President, West Dallas Coalition for Environmental
Justice, in Dallas, Tex. (Jan. 5, 2000).
50 W. DALLAS Toxic TIMEs Apr. 1992.
51 WDCEJ members provide contrasting estimates of membership numbers: President
Sepulveda estimates that the membership peaked at approximately 10,300. Interview with
Luis Sepulveda, supra note 49.
52 Id.
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on resident health. As the Coalition was being organized, it was
impossible for its members to understand the full extent of the
environmental impacts of industrial land uses that dotted the land-
scape. Therefore, the organization targeted sites that had been
monitored by residents who were able to observe stack emissions
or site activities. Early community organizing centered around
WDCEJ members and parents seeking support from the Dallas
Independent School District in complaining about night emissions
from an asphalt plant on Chalk Road and a fertilizer plant near
Edison. Documents found in Coalition files also indicate a focus
on W.R. Grace and Company and its efforts to continue a permit
for a vermiculite exfolitation facility on Manila Road. 54 Knowl-
edge of facility operations was gathered on an ad hoc basis by Coa-
lition members, as exemplified by this account from a resident of
neighboring Arcadia Park:
Well, [w]e started seeing a lot of our trees dying. That was
the first. And all of a sudden we'd get up, and it would be
very,'very cloudy. And we started, I told Luis [Sepulveda]
something is terribly wrong. Our trees, out of I think when
we moved here we might have had 27, 28 trees, and we had
to cut them because they died. So this is what we did: I told
Luis something, and it wasn't until he says, "Rachel, I have a
feeling there is something besides just fumes from the cars.
I have a feeling because I live in the area, I think that it's
something contaminating the air." So we began to look.
And then, one neighbor called me. And he said, "have you
passed through Chalk Hill?" He says, "have you passed
about, oh, about two-o'clock in the morning?" "No."
"Well," he says, "1 did, and there was some kind of a furnace
or something is burning in the back of y'all's, right before
you get to Davis, there's an empty space there" .. . Well, we
were at the park one afternoon, and we stayed until 9
o'clock with a city councilperson, and we looked out and we
saw a big fire ... and so everybody says it's coming from
Chalk Hill, it's a big incinerator ... And we went to the city
53 Joseph Garcia, Tests Show Metal Levels Likely Safe, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 4,
1990 at 38A.
54 Air Pollution Control Section, City of Dallas, Inspection of W.R. Grace & Co. Site,
(June 26, 1984) (on file with the Virginia Environmental Law Journal); Notice of Applica-
tion by W.R. Grace and Company: Permit Application Number R-1916-A, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Nov. 14, 1989 at 10A; Letter from Allen Eli Bell, Executive Director, Texas Air
Control Board, to J.D. Howell, Plant Manager, W.R. Grace & Co. (Dec. 22, 1989) (on file
with the Virginia Environmental Law Journal); Position Paper Against W.R. Grace & Co.,
(Citizens Against Toxic Chemicals and Hazards, Fort Worth, Tex.), March 1990, at 1.
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council, and they said that they weren't aware of it, so, Luis
said, "well, something's got to be done."55
The first of a decade's worth of newspaper articles to cover the
Coalition described a march of over seventy-five people to protest
pollution in their neighborhoods, celebrate, the closing of an
asphalt plant, and demonstrate their opposition to requests for a
special city zoning permit for a small oil tank facility. 6 Much of
the following year witnessed weekly marches and protests of a vari-
ety of facilities, as well as West Dallas schools where soil was later
found contaminated with lead and arsenic.5 7 These and other strat-
egies were developed in part through the group's affiliation with
Texans United, a regional advocacy group that provided informa-
tion on "how to work with the media, who to contact in the media,
what to ask for in terms of demands from the bureaucracy, what
kind of testing," and other strategies.58 These actions met with
some success. For example, the Dallas Environmental Health
Advisory Commission was formed, which drafted new guidelines to
regulate waste incinerators strictly, requiring buffer areas and mini-
mum lot sizes, and more extensive notification of neighbors to
planned facilities.59
The Coalition also began raising awareness that previous court-
ordered cleanups had neglected to remove much of the lead and
other toxicants from single-family residential areas in West Dallas.
This task of raising awareness proceeded along two trajectories: (1)
protests during which residents, mostly senior citizens, recounted a
55 Telephone Interview with Rachel Alanzo, Member, West Dallas Coalition for Envi-
ronmental Justice (Jan. 6, 2000).
56 Steve Scott, W. Dallas Residents Target Two Plants in Pollution Protest, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 2, 1990, at 41A. The following articles document additional activities
of the Coalition and its specific objectives during its first year of operations: David Jackson,
City Panel to Probe Pollution Complaints, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 17, 1991, at 28A
(describing the WDCEJ's desire to "ban toxic emissions in the area"); James Ragland,
Environmental Racism Alleged: Residents Say City Allows Too Many Industrial Sites in
West Dallas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 28, 1991, at 34A (describes the WDCEJ as
making several demands of city officials, including "a ban on new toxic emissions in the
area, a serious reduction in the amount of toxic emissions allowed, community involvement
with government and business representatives in reducing environmental hazards, and
recruitment of safe industries with less-hazardous jobs in West Dallas").
57 See, e.g., Joseph Garcia & Dan Shine, EPA Targets 2 Schools for Cleanup: Lead, Arse-
nic Found at W. Dallas Sites, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 17, 1991, at 11; Dan R.
Barber, Swifter Cleanup Urged: Residents Criticize EPA in Protest at W. Dallas School,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 11, 1991, at 22A.
58 Interview with Community Organizer, supra note 45.
59 See Joseph Palmore, Council OKs Regulations Affecting Waste Incinerators, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1991, at 37A.
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history of living with contamination, and (2) efforts to gather scien-
tific evidence of environmental harm. City and state officials agree
that awareness raising was the most effective activity in which the
Coalition engaged.
The WD [West Dallas] site was kind of rediscovered by citi-
zens reporting to our regional people in Dallas which was
then the TWC [Texas Water Commission], and they brought
it to the EPA's attention and TWC's attention and I wasn't
involved at that point but our removal people started doing
a removal in some of the neighborhood houses that were
highest in lead concentration ... The state kind of took the
lead at first because the citizens brought, they brought our
attention to it.
60
I remember where people actually brought in [lead] slag
chips into the city council meetings and I think really just
the people, especially the Housing Authority people, also
some of the environmental people from West Dallas, the
West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice is what
they're called. Making sure that they attended all the meet-
ings to show that there was interest in the neighborhood to
clean it up ... I think that the awareness is probably the
biggest thing because if you don't advertise the issues, if you
think that they only affected one area when it is more wide-
spread, I think that bringing just the awareness publicly has
been the most positive thing that they have done. They
have done petitions and stuff, they have put up signs to say
"Superfund Site" or whatever, but the biggest impact has
been to make the public aware of the issue regarding lead
contamination, any other kind of contamination, so people
can ask.6
As evidenced in the process through that the WDCEJ gained its
early members, the origins of the Coalition involved the concomi-
tant development of the above trajectories. President Luis
Sepulveda describes the social networking which fueled the
organization:
I went to Mr. Hernandez, I saw Hernandez cut from here to
here, and. I said, "What happened to you, sir?" He said,
"Man, the industries." I said, "Can I test your home?"
Sure. So we opened up one of the walls, and by golly if it
wasn't dust all over. So we went in. I can show you the little
60 Telephone Interview with Official, Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission
(Jan. 21, 2000).
61 Telephone Interview with Member, Dallas City Council (Jan. 18, 2000).
2001] Secondary Effect of Environmental Justice Litigation
boxes of different things, the slag, I kept everything in little
boxes. Then I went to Teresa Martinez. And then I saw
Teresa's hand, just curled up, deformed. Because she was
born in the time, in the 30's when this lead smelter was
going 150 miles per hour and nobody was saying anything
about it ...And then I saw Indio. Indio died of a heart
attack. Then I saw Mrs. Maldenado's husband had died of a
heart attack. And I'm saying, hello? I'm seeing a pattern of
what's going on. Then I talked to Ms. Lee who hears about
what I'm doing over there. Ms. Lee comes in and joins. Ms.
Lee's got hundreds of followers. Then we get a gentleman
R.T. Conley, he's got hundreds of followers, too. That's
how we started forming.62
This account shows a juxtaposition of resident accounts of long-
term exposure to toxic chemicals and efforts by Coalition leaders
to gather scientific evidence in the form of soil and dust concentra-
tions and (later) blood lead levels. Awareness of the cumulative
health effects of local industries as a function of time was prevalent
among the residents who joined the Coalition. They describe the
pervasiveness of "awful odors," "haze," "rain like acid," and other
phenomena that persisted "day and night. '63 These descriptions
are coupled with equally vivid accounts of human suffering brought
about through decades of exposure:
I tell you way back in those years it was so strong at night
that we could hardly sleep. 'Cause that odor would come
into the house. It was very strong. That plant was working
day and night. It was just an awful odor that we got. And
then the roofing company next, on Fish Trap [Road], that's
another one. We used to walk out there to the corner of
Fish Trap and Singleton to take the bus into town, and we
had to cover our noses while we were standing there waiting
for the bus. Because that roofing company was working day
and night, day and night...
Q: How long have you lived here?
Since 1940.
Q: And when did these problems begin?
They were always there.64
It's impossible that they cleaned it up. As long as the dirt in
the earth has been here, how is they going to come in here
and clean up something that people have inhaled, drinked,
62 Interview with Luis Sepulveda, supra note 49.
63 See Interview with Mary Nunez, supra note 47;- Interview with Deacon Moore, supra
note 46.
64 Interview with Mary Nunez, supra note 47.
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do you understand what I'm saying? We were straining it
and everything, but that lead is poison, it's strong poison...
Because even, you take my yard. They did [remediated] it.
But the point was, I was already damaged. Understand
what I'm saying? I was already damaged!65
At the same time, soil, dust, and water sampling and testing,
through the National Toxics Campaign in Boston, were used to dis-
cover areas of environmental hazard, as exemplified by
Sepulveda's description of early door-to-door social networking.66
This strategy was used to assess the extent of contamination result-
ing from industrial activities within the area and served as a means
of criticizing previous EPA cleanup efforts as well as the lack of
land use controls in West Dallas.
The historical development of the Coalition highlights fluctua-
tions in the organization's membership, dilemmas concerning
resource allocation, and different strategies used to identify and
define the problems facing the community. A high rate of turnover
was evident, as was the variance in level of involvement (time and
effort) in decision-making processes among members. Constraints
imposed by the lack of formal inclusion of the organization in envi-
ronmental permitting and cleanup processes meant that often the
group had to make decisions without adequate time or resources to
prepare. Under these circumstances, the manner in which the Coa-
lition tapped resident involvement and put member skills to work
was not always clear to its members.
65 Interview with Lee Hopkins, Member, West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Jus-
tice, in Dallas, Tex. (Jan. 5, 2000).
66 See West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice, Test Results of Second Round
of Sampling (1991) (on file with the Virginia Environmental Law Journal). Presents labo-
ratory results of soil, dust and water samples from a variety of locations throughout West
Dallas (for lead and cadmium). Concentrations above 500 parts per million of lead were
considered hazardous at the time. Action Memorandum: Request for Removal Action at
the West Dallas (RSR) Lead Site, United States Environmental Protection Agency from
Warren Zehner, Senior On-Site Coordinator to Robert E. Layton, Regional Administrator
(October 24, 1991) at 7 (describing 500 ppm as an "acceptable public health risk for this
type of setting."). Sites tested included the Sepulveda residence (696 ppm of lead), the
Marinez residence (644 ppm of lead), a residence within the Dallas Housing Authority
(3520 ppm of lead), and lead slag from a local dump site (108,500 ppm of lead). See also
Memorandum from B. Johnson, to H. Greenwald, Sample Analysis Results, West Dallas
(Aug. 19, 1991) (on file with the Virginia Environmental Law Journal). Topsoil samples
from residential yards ranged from 70-6,170 ppm of lead. The results also describe: "[Ihead
slag from next to abandoned battery factory. Between the building and the railroad tracks
this material very visible and I was told it is 8 to 10 feet in depth. It can be found all over
the West Dallas area mixed into native soil. Old time residents report that this material
was used as fill extensively in the area and is found in most of the residential and commer-
cial areas in West Dallas."
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B. Crisis.
In response to Coalition protests, the Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Commission (TNRCC, which in 1991 was called the
Texas Water Commission) conducted a visual survey of 6,800
homes in West Dallas residential areas "to identify the ones that
had battery fill materials, and [they] collected samples from
them. 67 When the TNRCC found visual evidence of lead battery
chips in residential yards, it took samples for a variety of toxicants,
including lead, arsenic, and cadmium.6" Shortly thereafter, the state
agency began a soil removal action at the most highly contami-
nated homes, and the EPA began to review its mid-1980's
removal.69
A crisis emerged for the Coalition when it discovered that the
EPA (which had assumed control over renewed soil excavation
efforts) was planning to excavate contaminated soil from residen-
tial and other areas in West Dallas and store it at the RSR lead
smelter. The site, at the intersection of Westmoreland and Single-
ton, was immediately adjacent to elementary schools, homes, and'
children's recreational facilities.t 1 In the southeastern corner of
the smelter stood a building known as the "batch house," which
had been selected by the EPA for the temporary storage.7' Warren
Zehner, who conducted emergency removals involving residential
areas for the EPA Emergency Response Branch, described how the
site was chosen:
I thought I had a place originally for some interim storage at
the Dallas Housing Authority . . . [o]ver in the DHA on
Delhi between Denison and Baker, that area is abandoned,
and was also fenced at the time. So what I was going to do is
I had repaired the fence, and there's a concrete street, Delhi
67 Interview with Carlos Sanchez, Manager, Environmental Protection Agency Region
VI Superfund Project, in Dallas, Tex. (Jan. 4, 2000).
68 Interview with Official, Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, supra
note 60.
69 Id.; Thaai Walker, Lead Woes Found Across W. Dallas, Not Just at Slag Sites, Residents
Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6, 1991, at 17A.
70 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 3, W. Dallas Coalition
for Envtl. Justice v. United States, (N.D. Tex. 1991) (No. 3-91-2615-R).
71 "Inside [the batch house] is the center of the West Dallas lead problem: tons of con-
taminated soil dug up from the neighborhood's homes and placed there for temporary
storage. The building has a doorway wider and taller than a truck. It is never closed or
locked. The building has no door. It does have plastic strips that hang down to block the
wind from blowing the soil out, [EPA Spokesman] Mr. Bary said." Randy Lee Loftis,
More Than 10 Years of Pollution Reports Unheeded: Records Reveal Buck-Passing among
Agencies, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 9, 1993, at 29A.
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right there in the middle, that has some big parking bay type
areas. And what I was going to do was put the material in
there and cover it up and use that as interim storage more
really than anything else . . . But that, you know, fell
through. So then I became aware of the Murmur Tract 1
facility. And after discussion, after a meeting with the
owner of that facility and touring the facility, the-what's
called the batch house is a building that was designed, you
know, when this facility was constructed to hold lead-con-
taminated materials, you know, predominantly the lead
plates of batteries. But it's-it was a totally ideal place
because, you know, very rarely in a near residential setting
you find an industrial facility that's abandoned, it's contami-
nated already, and it's designed for storage.72
Knowing that under the Consent Order filed with Murmur Met-
als, Inc. there was no limit to the amount of material or time that
contaminated soil could be stored at the RSR lead smelter, the
Coalition sought legal assistance.73 The case, which became West
Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice v. United States and Wil-
liam K. Reilly, U.S. EPA7 1 (hereinafter WDCEJ v. EPA), was ini-
tially filed by Gilbert Medina and amended by Legal Services of
North Texas. The case was amended in order to seek a preliminary
injunction enjoining the EPA from opening the storage facility,
which would result in the creation of an illegal hazardous waste
storage facility in a residential neighborhood.75 Such actions would
occur just as the Department of Housing and Urban Development
was attempting to add 1,000 families to the Dallas Housing Author-
ity housing projects across the street.76
72 Transcript of Hearing Before the Hon. Judge Buckmeyer Regarding Plaintiff's
Request for Temporary Injunction at 29-30, W. Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice v.
United States, (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 1991). (No. 3-91-2615-R).
73 Id. at 44.
74 Plaintiff's Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support
of the Motion, W. Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice v. United States, (N.D. Tex. 1991)
(No. 3-91-2615-R).
75 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 70 at 3.
76 Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 and relevant regula-
tions, operation of a hazardous waste storage facility requires groundwater monitoring,
record keeping, preparedness prevention procedures, contingency 'and emergency proce-
dures, a written waste analysis plan, inspection schedule, and logs, an operating record, a
closure plan and cost estimate, and equipment and facilities to prevent the release of con-
taminated runoff from a site. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1995). None of the above provisions were
in place for the RSR site according to plaintiffs. In addition, the Texas Water Commission
had requested that the site "be addressed as a High Priority Violator due to numerous
remaining unresolved noncompliances" on March 1, 1991. Plaintiff's Second Amended
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Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief states
that "[f]or over ten years, defendants have been aware of the exis-
tence of hazardous waste sites, including contaminated soil, dust,
and slag, in residential and other areas" and "failed to conduct a
proper cleanup."77 Such acts are described as contributing to irrep-
arable harm to West Dallas residents that would continue unless
defendants were enjoined from the siting of contaminated soil at
the RSR smelter." The Coalition's Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining defendants from illegally treating,
storing, or disposing of hazardous waste at the RSR site also asked
the court for a preliminary and permanent injunction that would
(a) enjoin defendants from opening the facility; (b) order the EPA
to implement a plan developed in 1985 by the Centers for Disease
Control to determine the sources and pathways for lead and other
contamination; (c) order defendants to secure by fencing any sites
at local schools or public locations from which defendants did not
immediately remove contaminated soil; (d) order defendants to
process previous referrals by the Texas Water Commission of RSR/
Murmur Corporation violations of hazardous waste storage regula-
tions at the RSR site; and (e) appoint experts for the monitoring
and assessment of contamination and to plan for a non-discrimina-
tory level of environmental conditions.79 While WDCEJ v. EPA
included a number of claims of civil rights violations such as race
discrimination through adverse local land use patterns and viola-
tions of federal hazardous substance and waste control regulations,
the seven years which followed its filing centered around the Coali-
tion's hazardous waste storage concerns.
IV. SECONDARY EFFECTS OF WDCEJ V. EPA.
A. Organizational.
Following the adoption of a litigation strategy, it became clear
that the filing of WDCEJ v. EPA marked an implicit adoption of
scientific rationality over the focus on cumulative exposure stories
which had prompted many residents to join the Coalition. Coali-
tion leaders and their attorneys filed motions for court-appointed
experts to develop and recommend plans for monitoring "any
Complaint and Complaint in Intervention at 24, W. Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice v.
United States, (N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 23, 1992) (No. 3-91-2615-R).
77 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 70 at 2.
78 Id. at 3.
79 Plaintiff's Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction, supra note 74.
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adverse personal and environmental effects of soil removal. '8 0
They also filed emergency motions in a related case to initiate child
blood lead level testing"' and argued that increased negative health
effects during and after the 1984-85 cleanup would be repeated
through storage of soil at the RSR smelter.82 As Coalition reliance
on the scientific proof of discriminatory harm through litigation
grew, the perceived need for protests, meeting attendance, testi-
mony at hearings, and picketing around industrial land uses (as
well as the use of stories of long-term exposure) diminished. 3
Scientific evidence was not only sought in support of the
requested permanent injunction of RSR storage. Court-appointed
experts also assessed the risk of environmental hazards in the area
in order to bolster claims of racial discrimination against the City
of Dallas, the State, and the EPA. 4 Such evidence was important
from the standpoint of mitigating harm caused by hazardous waste
removal and storage, although its relevance for Coalition members
was questionable (for example, blood level screening does not
account for long-term exposure). 85 Despite its questionable utility
from the standpoint of Coalition members, a number of organiza-
tional characteristics served to lock-in the primacy of both scien-
tific evidence over resident accounts of sickness as a function of
time and of litigation over other possible strategies.
Coalition members learned from the experiences of others by
studying previous legal actions in West Dallas. Residents com-
monly expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that settlements
in the mid-1980's and 1995 (regarding contamination from the RSR
80 Plaintiff's Motion for a Court-Appointed Expert and Memorandum in Support of
Motion at 1, W. Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice v. United States, (N.D. Tex. 1992) (No.
3-91-2615-R) (filed March 23, 1992).
81 Interview with Attorney A, West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice, in Dal-
las, Tex. (Jan. 5, 2000).
82 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and Complaint in Intervention, supra note
76, at 6.
83 Accounts of alternative strategies decreased markedly following the adoption of a
legal strategy. Roughly 40% of all accounts in the Dallas Morning News of protest, picket-
ing, and attendance at council and other meetings occurred in 1991 (based on an assess-
ment of all articles published in the Dallas Morning News regarding Coalition activities
from 1989-1999). Following the critical juncture, the proportion of media accounts of alter-
native strategies fell as follows: 16.7% (1992), 7.1% (1993), 16.7% (1994), 9.5% (1995),
2.4% (1996), 2.4% (1997), 0.0% (1998), 4.7% (1999).
84 Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Injunc-
tive Relief supra note 70 at 1.
85 AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERV., CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE: LEAD TOXICITY 14
(1992).
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smelter) focused solely on children living near the facility 6 or
favored residents of the Dallas Housing Authority projects over
single family residential neighborhoods to the northwest. Regard-
less of resident knowledge about previous class action lawsuits,
there was a common belief that, as with cases centered around
pediatric health, Coalition member illnesses and sufferings over the
course of decades could be encapsulated in a single test of blood
plasma. Thus, as more residents became aware of court-ordered
testing, the perceived benefits of participating in such programs
increased for individual residents. Members began to adapt to the
notion that their suffering could be proven once and for all, a belief
that was encouraged by Coalition attorneys:
Like any lawyer would say, you have to have evidence,
you have to have proof before they can do anything about it.
But as far as that's concerned, we have gone as far as we
can. There's no more to add into it or nothing. There's
nothing left to prove.87
Right now, I ask him, in our case, what do you need? He
says, "I don't need anything. Everything is factual. Every-
thing is proven. You've done everything. You don't have to
do anything anymore." Even though I haven't protested in
about two years... [the Coalition's] job was to prove, beyond
a shadow of a doubt that our community was contaminated.
His job 'as an attorney is to come in and defend us.8s
The main thing is what does the science say about what's
on the ground or in the groundwater... We usually rely on
whatever you can get from the other side [defendants]. Like
86 A member of the organization described the progression of cases as follows:
We had the John Phillip Weisner one. We won that one. That was '84, '85.
New Start had one, with Mark, Crowley, and Douglas, they won that one,
which I thought it was 15 million. And that was about the smelter and the
damage to the kids, the health . . . And they told us all the way from the
beginning that they were going to accept adults and kids. But they just took
all the kids ... And what they did was they did a smart thing. They didn't
have to prove nothing. That first lawsuit was already settled. So all they did
was have us go and gather up all the kids that were overlooked and didn't
know about the first lawsuit, and were born during this time, and were living
in this area during this time. And that brought them under this other lawsuit.
So what they had done was get the kids who were overlooked. So that's
when, after they found out that they had dropped the adults, the Coalition got
[the attorneys for WDCEJ v. EPA]. Telephone Interview with Member, West
Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice (Jan. 23, 2000).
See generally, Randy Lee Loftis & Craig Flournoy, Lead Firm OK's Suit Settlement: 587 W.
Dallas Kids May Get $16 Million, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 23, 1995, at IA.
87 Interview with Alex Hernandez, supra note 48.
88 Interview with Luis Sepulveda, supra note 49.
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the blood lead test. Make them do the blood lead test.
Apply their own science on the soil contamination.89
Group learning about the effectiveness of previous legal actions,
coupled with interpretations of their relevance to Coalition objec-
tives, increased the perceived utility of litigation structured around
scientific testing. Once adopted, limited resources encouraged
other mechanisms that perpetuated the primacy of scientific ration-
ality. The juxtaposition of professional legal services with an infor-
mal organization lacking a budget encouraged the Coalition to
substitute elements of the former in its efforts to keep track of its
internal operations. Legal documentation began to substitute for
membership records. Social networks, which accounted for the
Coalition's initial growth in membership, started to erode.
Residents began to rely on occasional meetings with attorneys at
local schools or the West Dallas Multipurpose Center, during
which they were provided "progress" updates (recall that the only
formal communication between the Coalition and its members was
a newsletter issued in April, 1992):
So, what happened was, when we started having meetings
for this last lawsuit, they would get a sheet, and they would
pass and have the people sign a sheet to get in on the law-
suit. And [the Coalition] would bring them in by signing the
sheet, and made them a part of the Coalition. And people
didn't even realize what they were signing and coming a part
of. 9 0
It seems like everything fell apart. From what I can see
about it it seemed like we wasn't making no progress...
Progress that we would have success in our operation that
they would work on it and let us know what process was
going on. We had two or three different people, lawyers.9 '
Limited interaction among Coalition members and leadership
restricted the members' ability to assess true progress vis-a-vis
other strategies, which were employed less frequently. As litiga-
tion became accepted as the organization's primary strategy, other
activities were evaluated in terms of whether they could be used in
support of legal action. As communication with the attorneys less-
89 Interview with Attorney B, West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice, in Dal-
las, Tex. (Jan. 5, 2000).
90 Telephone Interview with Member, West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice,
supra note 45.
91 Interview with Deacon Moore, supra note 46.
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ened, the Coalition lacked the information necessary to determine
how other activities could further the dominant strategy:
[We don't have meetings] very often. Because [President
Sepulveda] told me that this case was already in Judge
Buckmeyer's [court]. And he's holding the case. We don't
know when he's going to bring it into court. It's been years,
but it's still there. We thought for a while that everything
was dead, gone, and forgotten, but Sepulveda kept saying
no, it ain't, it ain't dead. It's in [the judge's] hands, and he's
the only one that's been holding it for the last two years, or
three, and they were supposed to knock down the smelter
since last year, and nothing has been done.9 2
[A]fter we seen that the lawyers wasn't coming up to they
standards, they wasn't giving us no kind of report, the pro-
tests went down. After we seen the protests wasn't doing
much good, we slacked off ... Only thing that's changed is
we just said that we wasn't going to go out and protest like
we'd been when it wasn't getting no response. 93
And it's another thing that I'm saying to the members.
You're winning, you've won everything you asked for.
Declared a 16 mile radius [Superfund site]. We didn't get it
cleaned up the way we wanted to, but the courts will take
care of that. Let the courts start taking care of some of that.
We don't have to be out in that freezing, raining cold any-
more . . . We're doing things a little bit different now, and
we're using the court system to do some of these battles.94
B. Legal.
The use of scientific testing to bolster legal claims yielded three
important secondary effects. Coalition attorneys had previously
represented Debra Walker, a resident of Dallas Housing Authority
(DHA) public housing across the street from the RSR smelter, in a
housing segregation suit.95 After the DHA was created by the Dal-
las City Council in 1938, the first site for DHA public housing, or
"Negro slum area" was selected by the City Manager.96 The pur-
pose of this and subsequent developments, particularly the West
92 Interview with Mary Nunez, supra note 47.
93 Interview with Deacon Moore, supra note 46.
94 Interview with Luis Sepulveda, supra note 49.
95 Walker v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 734 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Tex.
1989).
96 Id at 1293; See also CITY OF DALLAS, A MASTER PLAN FOR DALLAS, TEXAS, REPORT
No. 10 HOUSING, PLATE 16 (1944) (on file with the Virginia Environmental Law Journal)
(outlining several "Negro districts," one of which encompasses the entire area known as
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
Dallas Project (1950-55) in which Debra Walker resided, was to
prevent blacks from moving into white areas of the city. The West
Dallas housing project, the largest low-rise public housing project
in the nation with 3,500 units, addressed the "Negro housing prob-
lem," which was defined as a "shortage of housing for Negroes in
Dallas" that would result in "overcrowding, dissatisfaction, disease,
and tension resulting from Negroes buying into white neighbor-
hoods." 97 The project was completely segregated, including sepa-
rate parks and commercial areas for black, Hispanic, and white
residents. Within two years, however, substantial vacancies were
reported in George Loving Place, the section reserved for white
residents. The DHA attributed this in part to "environmental dis-
advantages, such as odors, smoke, and dust from neighboring
industrial plants." 98 Due to the lack of housing alternatives for
blacks in the greater Dallas area, the concentration of blacks in
West Dallas public housing increased.99
While a consent decree issued in 1987 was designed to remedy
violations by the DHA in the form of purposeful segregation, it did
not specifically address the impacts on human health that resulted
from residing in the project. Attorneys for the Coalition described
the impact of the Coalition's pursuit of legal action on the Walker
v. HUD case:
Once the Coalition brought it to our attention we also, on
our public housing lawsuit raised the issue of the people liv-
ing in the public housing at the time being contaminated
from the soil. We filed emergency motions asking for the
children to be tested, blood lead testing. We asked the court
to appoint environmental experts.'()()
In the public housing case the city agreed to a systematic assess-
ment of the blood lead levels of people in public housing in West
Dallas."0
West Dallas); LEUW, CATHER, & CO., WEST DALLAS URBAN AREA SURVEY 13 (1959) (on
file with the Virginia Environmental Law Journal).
97 CITY OF DALLAS, REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEGRO HOUSING: DALLAS
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, DALLAS CITIZENS COUNCIL, AND DALLAS INTER-RACIAL COM-
MITTEE 20 (May 24, 1950).
98 Id.
99 The proportion of blacks living in the George Loving Place area increased to 35% by
1967, and it was 72% by 1969, 90% black by 1971, and 95% black by 1974. Walker v.
United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., supra note 95 at 1297.
100 Interview with Attorney A, supra note 81.
101 Interview with Attorney A, supra note 81.
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This investigation resulted in the addition of Tracey Smith as a
named plaintiff-class representative to the Walker v. HUD civil
action. 1' 2 The original complaint filed as a result of this order
describes Smith as a member of a class residing within DHA hous-
ing that had become increasingly segregated following the issuance
of the Walker decree, and to which:
the DHA had "failed to disclose the risks of childhood lead
poisoning to the class members as part of an order to per-
petuate the racial segregation in DHA's low-income housing
programs"103 and "expos[ed] the family members of the
class to the risks of childhood lead poisoning."10 4
Tracey Smith's two older children had elevated blood lead
levels. 10 5 The interior soil and dust in her housing unit also con-
tained elevated lead levels." 6 The risks of childhood lead po.isoning
had never been disclosed to her family. In 1995, the court entered
a remedial order (due to the lack of city's compliance with previous
consent decrees) limiting the number of units in the DHA area of
West Dallas to 900.107 Since then, the DHA has demolished hun-
dreds of units, replacing them elsewhere with other forms of
housing.108
Reliance on scientific testing throughout DHA public housing
and areas surrounding the RSR facility unearthed clusters of chil-
dren under the age of six with elevated blood lead levels, including
the children of Tracey Smith. 10 9 One cluster was located in an area
surrounding an iron foundry known as Refinery Casting Com-
pany. 1  Coalition attorneys filed suit on behalf of Carlos Jackson,
102 Order Granting Motion to Add Ms. Tracey Smith as a Named Plaintiff-Class Repre-
sentative, Walker v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., (N.D. Tex. 1994) (No.
3:85-CV-1210-R );Plaintiff-lntervenor Smith's Original Complaint at 16, Walker v. United
States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., (N.D. Tex. 1993) (No. 3-85-1210-R).
103 Plaintiff-Intervenor Smith's Original Complaint, supra note 102 at 11.
104 Id. at 11.
105 Id. at 12.
106 Id. at 12.
107 Interview with Attorney B, supra note 89.
108 Id.
109 Plaintiff-intervenor Smith's Original Complaint, supra note 102 at 12.
110 Interview with Attorney A, supra note 61(describing a land use map of West
Dallas):
And you see the industrial zoning all throughout the community. These dots
are from 1992 and are the result of our blood lead level work. The city went
out and set up blood lead testing, and we made them do it for all of the
residents of the public housing project. Whoever showed up. In the housing
authority, everybody showed up. One of these clusters was for this foundry,
Refinery Castings.
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who resided one-half mile from the site, against the refinery and its
property owner, which had consistently violated city environmental
and zoning ordinances.11 The case was settled out of court and
resulted in the closure and enfencement of the facility.' 12 An addi-
tional case, Thompson v. Raiford,' 13 was filed after a resident of
DHA housing discovered through court-ordered testing that her
grandchildren had elevated levels of lead in their blood. Previous
doctor visits under Medicaid's Early and Periodic Screening, Diag-
nosis, and Treatment ("EPHDT") program had not produced
results to indicate elevated levels." 4 The Coalition's attorney's dis-
covered that the program was using a nutrition indicator used to
detect anemia and malnutrition rather than a blood lead testing
program." 5 Blood lead level testing is now required as part of the
EPSDT screening test." 16
C. Scientific/Political.
Other secondary effects of WDCEJ v. EPA involve the actions
of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Dallas City Council,
and neighboring residential organizations. Under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act' ' 7
the EPA announced that a sixteen mile radius surrounding the
RSR smelter would be proposed to the National Priorities List" 8
"' Complaint, Jackson v. Lott and Refinery Casting Co. (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 1996) (No.
396CV0173-P); See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH DIVISION, CITY OF DALLAS, NOTICE
OF VIOLATION TO REFINERY CASTINGS COMPANY (Jan. 7, 1972). Reports of "very heavy
(100% opacity) black emissions" from the cupola stack and public health violations were
issued almost annually from 1972 to 1992.
112 Interview with Attorney B, supra note 89.
"3 Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction and Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Support of TRO and Preliminary Injunction, Thompson v. Raiford (N.D.
Tex. 1992) (No. 3:92-CV-1539-R).
114 Id. at 3-4.
115 Id.at 4.
116 Interview with Attorney B, supra note 89; See also, Settlement Agreement at 3,
Thompson v. Raiford (N.D. Tex. 1993) (No. 3:92-CV-1539-R ).
117 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. §9601 et seq. (1980). Established authority to remediate con-
tamination from past waste disposal practices that endanger or threaten public health or
the environment. This amendment and reauthorization to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. §6901-6992(k) (1976)) imposes strict liability on responsible par-
ties, establishes a "Superfund" to finance cleanup actions, and imposes costs on those who
generated or handled hazardous substances.
118 Section 105 of CERCLA requires the Environmental Protection Agency to maintain
a National Priorities List (NPL) of hazardous sites that have known or threatened releases.
Through a highly technical process designed to assess potential exposure through a number
of media as well as potential target populations, abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites are identified. Placement on the NPL makes a site eligible for remedial action
financed under the Superfund. U.S. E.P.A., PROCEDURES FOR COMPLETION AND DELE-
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for cleanup on May 10, 1993.119 The EPA's procedures for address-
ing the Superfund site suggest how the trajectory chosen by the
Coalition was compatible with the EPA's policies toward risk
assessment. The site was divided into five Operable Units
("OUs"): the TWC study area (single family residential), the DHA
property, slag/battery chip burial areas, the smelter facility
grounds, and other RSR/Murmur facilities.t" The EPA's stated
task was to ensure that in properties targeted for soil removal, the
risk of excess blood lead levels would be reduced, and the risk of
cancer cases from other toxicants would be no greater than one in
one million. 12 1 EPA and TNRCC officials describe the process of
risk assessment for the West Dallas Superfund site:
Currently we have a pharmacological model called the
Uptake Biokinetic Model which evaluates various uptake
pathways into the human body. And then it compares those
against 10 mg/dL blood lead level. So what you do is put in
- you put in all the parameters, you put in all the numbers
you have for the parameters. And if you don't have num-
bers for parameters you can default, or if you can't use the
numbers, they can't translate into the model, then you use a
default. And the - basically what you're looking for is 95%
of the population to have a blood lead level less than 10 mg/
dL and basically that's 500 parts per million [soil
concentration]. 122
[W]e want the risk to be one excess cancer case, meaning
above normal cancer rates, one excess cancer case per mil-
lion people. So the target is typically one in a million. The
calculations include such things as body weight, how-long
the person lives on the site, they make assumptions like they
live on the site, they do certain things, they're exposed to
dust, and they inadvertently eat a little of the dirt over a
thirty year period, being there eight hours a day and this
kind of thing ... It uses a 30 year timeline, called the averag-
ing time. 123
TION OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST SITES (1989); U.S. E.P.A., "DALLAS LEAD" Docu-
MENTATION RECORDS FOR HAZARD RANKING SYSTEM (1982).
119 United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, RSR Corporation Factsheet (May 27, 1993).
120 Interview with Carlos Sanchez, supra note 67.
121 U.S. E.P.A., RSR CORPORATION SUPERFUND SITE PROPOSED PLAN: OPERABLE
UNIT 1 (Nov. 18, 1994).
122 Transcript of Hearing Before the Hon. Judge Buckmeyer, supra note 72 at 27.
123 Interview with Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission Official, supra
note 60.
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With these assumptions in mind, the EPA began sampling and
remediating homes in Operable Unit 1 (single family residen-
tial). 124 Notice that the above assumptions are incompatible with
the initial concerns of Coalition members, namely:
" The average member had already been exposed to more
than 30 years of soil, dust, and water concentrations
exceeding the calculations used for elevated population
risk across the "averaging time";
" The focus on "current site risk" ignores cumulative expo-
sure across decades;
" Models for risk assessment do not account for the cumula-
tive effects of a variety of toxins;
" Risk assessment only accounts for primary exposure path-
ways. The EPA ignored contaminated dust, lead washed
under homes, and other sources of long-term exposure;125
The focus on blood lead levels in children encourages a reduction
in soil concentrations to an amount suitable for acceptable health
risks assuming that higher risks were not prevalent before the soil
remediation. Again, it should be noted that more than 95% of the
total lead in the body of an adult is stored in the bone marrow.
Tests of blood lead do not account for these concentrations, which
are released into the blood stream under periods of stress. 126
A number of Coalition members resisted the EPA's attempts to
clean up their yards, based on the belief that such actions would
not address their exposure over time and would discourage any
attempts at relocation. 27 Indeed, CERCLA does not authorize
the EPA to purchase properties that have been "successfully" cle-
aned up. 12' However, Coalition calls for more effective soil
remediation and blood lead level screening were more compatible
with the EPA's approach to risk assessment than to the objectives
of their own membership. Remedial actions ended in November
124 EPA Sucessfully Completes Home Sampling Study, SUPERFUND NEWSLINE (UJ.S.
E.P.A. Region 6), Winter 1993-94, at 1-3.
125 U.S. E.P.A., RSR CORP. SUPERFUND SITE FACT SHEET, RECORDS OF DECISION:
OPERABLE UNIT No. 1, OPERABLE UNIT No. 2 at 6-19 (May 10, 1995).
126 Lead Toxicity, supra note 85.
127 RSR CORPORATION SUPERFUND SITE PROPOSED PLAN OPERABLE UNIT 1, supra
note 121. A number of interviewees also described their refusal to allow EPA officials on
their property for the above reasons.
128 RSR CORPORATION FACTSHEET, supra note 119.
2001] Secondary Effect of Environmental Justice Litigation 463
1994 after cross-sectional comparisons of OU1 and a control area
yielded "no significant differences" in blood lead levels.'
29
The focus on scientific testing (particularly blood lead) also influ-
enced City Council and surrounding community actions. In fact,
the only substantive action committed by the Council in response
to WDCEJ v. EPA was to endorse a broader cleanup (including
neighboring Cadillac Heights) with more stringent target levels for
soil concentrations (250 parts per million), policies which were
never implemented. 3 ' No efforts have been made to rezone parts
of West Dallas or encourage stricter enforcement of public and
environmental health ordinances.
In August, 1995, residents in Cadillac Heights began to press for
similar pollution cleanup provisions. 1 ' TNRCC tests linked lead
from National Lead and Dixie lead smelters to elevated lead levels
in the soil of neighboring residences. 132 Shirley Garcia, head of the
Cadillac Heights Neighborhood Association, suggests that it was
Coalition President Sepulveda who galvanized the neighborhood in
response to environmental concerns. ' 33 The residents of Cadillac
Heights have continued to fight a turn of events similar to those
experienced in West Dallas, including failure by Texas and federal
officials to address hazardous materials dumped throughout the
community or accumulations of lead dust in homes.134 Residents
are now calling for a relocation plan in light of controversial
removal actions funded by National Lead and Dixie Metals owner
Exide Technologies.' 35
Table 1 summarizes the secondary effects of WDCEJ v. EPA.
Coalition behavior following the choice of a legal strategy illus-
trates the mechanisms through which a chosen functional alterna-
tive can be reinforced over time. The emergence of a mental
129 U.S. E.P.A., EPA Proposes Deletion of Residential Areas from NPL: RSR Corpora-
tion Superfund Site Operable Unit Nos 1 & 2 (Apr. 9, 1996) (flyer released on April 9,
1996 by the EPA).
130 Randy Lee Loftis, Rain Forces Delay in Lead Cleanup in West Dallas, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 27, 1991, at 23A.
131 Audrey Steinbergen Lundy, Residents Unite Over Lead Cleanup: W. Dallas Activist
Joins Cadillac Heights Effort, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 8, 1995, at 16A; Audrey
Steinbergen Lundy, Shouting Disrupts Meeting About Lead Contamination: Cadillac
Heights Residents, Lawmaker Tangle, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 10, 1995, at 27A.
132 Lundy, Residents Unite, supra note 131 at 16A; Lundy, Shouting Disrupts Meeting,
supra note 131 at 27A.
133 Lundy, Residents Unite, Supra note 131.
134 Randy Lee Loftis, Neighbors: Lead Not Cleaned Up - State Maintains That Smelter
Site is No Longer a Threat, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 12, 2001 at 33A.
135 Id.
Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 20:431
TABLE 1. THE SECONDARY EFFECTS OF WDCEJ v. EPA ET AL.
Secondary
Effect Description Impact on the Organization
Organizational Dominance of mental model Coalition focused on soil and
favoring scientific evidence over blood lead level testing.
cumulative exposure stories.
Breakdown in social networks; Increased reliance on commu-
decreased activity (i.e., protests, nication with legal staff; mem-
petitions, lobbying officials). bership eventually accounted for
through legal documents; belief
that "all is proven" scientifically.
Legal/Scientific Blood lead level testing Primacy of scientific testing
over narrative accounts of cumu-
ative exposure leads to discovery
Jackson v. Lott and Refinery of clusters of children with ele-
Casting Co. vated BLL around Refinery
Thompson v. Raiford Casting Co. and within Dallas
Housing Authority.
Political Influence over emergency Focus on temporary storage at
cleanup, batch house and the categoriza-
Weekly reports to court. tion of soil as hazardous through
Removal of contaminated soil testing encourages city council to
from RSR batch house. call for more stringent soil lead
RSR site designation changes. concentration standards, test and
City council action. cleanup facilities in East Dallas.
Cleanup of city playgrounds in No actions taken to address
East Dallas. cumulative exposure or haphaz-
Request that soil concentration ard zoning in West Dallas.
standards be lowered to 250
parts per million.
Community Community organizing in Community leaders adopt sim-
neighboring Cadillac Heights: ilar blood lead screening pro-
Miller v. City of Dallas grams in order to gather
evidence for suits against the
owners of two lead smelters in
Cadillac Heights and the City.
model favoring scientific evidence over cumulative exposure sto-
ries was encouraged by changes within the organization as well as
by the legal strategy that was adopted. Increased reliance on com-
munication with legal staff and a corresponding belief that "all is
proven" precipitated a breakdown in the social networks that had
constituted much of the Coalition's membership. Trial-and-error
learning, including knowledge of previous legal settlements,
encouraged local residents to coordinate their activities with those
of the legal staff in order to access expected benefits from litiga-
tion. However, a disconnect between Coalition leadership, mem-
2001] Secondary Effect of Environmental Justice Litigation 465
bers, and residents was fueled in part through greater acceptance
of scientific rationality by the former group. Coalition members
allocated decreasing amounts of attention to potential sources of
cumulative exposure to toxic chemicals or to strategies other than
litigation (some of which were commonly employed prior to the
use of litigation), even as their assessment of the use of litigation
grew increasingly negative. As members learned how to partici-
pate in legal action through the filing of court documents and par-
ticipation in court-ordered testing, the perceived benefits of
conformance with this strategy increased, and local residents
adapted accordingly.
Arguably, the predominance of scientific testing and evidence
following a crisis period is a mere extension of the Coalition's his-
torical development. indeed, soil, dust, and water samples were
taken on several occasions during the initial stages of the Coali-
tion's development, and they were used quite effectively to garner
media attention and locate potential exposure pathways. Still, the
organization's use of such techniques intensified to the detriment
of previously viable and successful organizing strategies, following
the decision to litigate. This shift can be traced directly to changes
in the Coalition's capacity to adapt to and manipulate its environ-
ment. More important, the reliance of the Coalition on scientific
evidence did not continue year after year. Rather, it subsided and
all but disappeared following the partial deletion of residential
areas of West Dallas from the National Priorities List and the dis-
missal of the CERCLA claims in WDCEJ v. EPA. As the influ-
ence of legal and scientific agencies in the Coalition's decision-
making environment subsided, the group renewed efforts to meet
their initial objectives of addressing the cumulative risks posed by
haphazard zoning and lack of environmental controls in West
Dallas.
On April 9, 1996, the EPA announced that it would remove resi-
dential areas from the National Priorities List, claiming that
"response actions are complete and no further cleanup is neces-
sary. ' 136 WDCEJ v. EPA lingered in the courts until 1998, when
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
dismissed the case's CERCLA claims. 137 Coalition attorneys credit
136 EPA PROPOSES DELETION OF RESIDENTIAL AREAS FROM NPL: RSR CORPORATION
SUPERFUND SITE OPERABLE UNIT Nos I & 2, supra note 121, at 1.
137 West Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice v. United States, No. 3:91-CV-2615-R, 1998
WL 892122, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 1998) (dismissing CERCLA claims for failure to give
proper notice in accordance with 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659(d)(1) (1995)).
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the case with encouraging the EPA to remove hazardous soil from
the RSR site. 138 Indeed, Judge Buckmeyer asked for the EPA to
submit weekly progress reports and "made it very clear to the EPA
that he wanted the soil out of RSR on no uncertain terms." 139
Thus, by 1998, the soil had been removed and transferred to a haz-
ardous waste storage facility offsite. 14" The Coalition was allowed
to amend its complaint to clarify that its claims were not site-spe-
cific, and the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, including the
original claims of environmental racism, is undergoing its fifth
motion to dismiss. 141
In 1996, a group of Coalition members protested the issuance of
a permit renewal for an industrial waste storage and processing
facility in West Dallas, owned by Heat Energy Advanced Technol-
ogy, Inc (H.E.A.T.). 42 The TNRCC denied the Coalition's request
for a hearing. 4 3 The Coalition appealed to the District Court and
was granted the right to a hearing. 44 H.E.A.T. and the Coalition
settled out of court, whereby the company agreed to decrease the
number of gallons of hazardous waste that it would process, incor-
porate clean-up and disposal services, and hire a certain proportion
of workers from the surrounding neighborhood. 145 Following the
H.E.A.T. case, the Coalition renewed its efforts to target a variety
of industrial land uses (such as Texas Industries and the Grand
Prairie Urban Sewer Plant), basing its evidence on stories of cumu-
lative exposure.
The main thing the residents complained of was the odors
coming from the [H.E.A.T.] plant were fairly severe, make
your eyes water, make you cough. Their kids, they were
concerned about them and their health. They just found it
to be a clear threat. Those odors were not just, you know
they were fumes, they were just concerned about that. They
138 Interview with Attorney B, supra note 89.
139 Interview with Attorney A, supra note 61. See also Transcript of Hearing Before the
Hon. Judge Buckmeyer, supra note 72 at 107.
140 West Dallas Coalition for Envil. Justice v. United States, supra note 137.
141 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and Complaint in Intervention, W. Dallas
Coalition for Envtl. Justice v. United States (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 1999) ( No. 3-91-2615-R).
142 Heat Energy Advanced Tech., Inc. v. W. Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice, 962
S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. App. 1998); Telephone Interview with Attorney C, West Dallas Coa-
lition for Environmental Justice (Mar. 22, 2000).
143 Heat Energy Advanced Tech., Inc., 962 S.W.2d at 290; Telephone Interview with
Attorney C, (March 22, 2000).
144 Heat Energy Advanced Tech., Inc., 962 S.W.2d at 290; Telephone Interview with
Attorney C, supra note 143.
145 Telephone Interview with Attorney C, supra note 142.
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felt like they were being poisoned by this company . ... And
they were concerned because they get the hazardous waste
in barrels, big 55 gallon drums, and they throw them on the
ground, and that's the reason they smell so bad, and they
look over and they see all this stuff laying around, they obvi-
ously have concerns about it seeping into the groundwater.
But concern is one thing. When you can't even walk
outside, that's another.1 46
There's a cement plant south of Dallas that a lot of the
group was involved with as well, just to bring awareness that
we don't need another cement burning kiln close to the city,
especially affecting the air quality. This was back before we
started hearing the EPA and all of these other people talk-
ing about tagging cities with penalties for having bad air. It
was Texas Industries. They basically turned their cement
kiln into burning garbage. The environmental coalition
opposed it, just trying to get the cities to pass ordinances to
oppose their licensing by the state. TNRCC gave back a
report that was inconclusive. But what did come to pass was
that Congress passed stricter standards and under those
standards, I don't think anybody is really going to be look-
ing to open cement kilns for burning garbage anytime soon
in West Dallas.'4 7
The dismissal of WDCEJ v. EPA's CERCLA claims lessened the
Coalition's focus on discrete scientific testing and evidence.
DISCUSSION
For decades a symbol of neglect by industry and agency officials,
the RSR smelter smokestack (in addition to smelter site buildings)
has finally been removed, brick by brick, from the West Dallas sky-
line. This development followed the approval of a consent decree
between the federal government and eight principally responsible
parties associated with the site. 4 ' Although the property lies dor-
146 Id.
147 Telephone Interview with Member, Dallas City Council, supra note 61; City of Dal-
las, Official Action of the Dallas City Council (Feb. 11, 1998) (requesting that the TNRCC
ensure that the Clean Air Act attainment status of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan
area be considered in the hearing on TXI Operations, L.P.'s pending permit application).
148 U.S. E.P.A. Region 6, RSR Corp. (Murph Metals) Site Description (Nov. 8, 2001);
Kendall Anderson, Lead Smelter set to be Demolished: Settlement Clears Way for Removal
of Longtime West Dallas Structure, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 23, 2000, at 27 A;
Randy Lee Loftis, Down to Earth: Crews to Begin Demolishing Old Lead Smelter Smoke-
stack, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 8, 2001, at 1A.
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mant 4 ' , countless industries remain in operation in West Dallas,
scattered among single-family homes. The Coalition has come full
circle, with renewed smaller-scale efforts to oppose industry permit
renewal applications. Luis Sepulveda, now serving as Justice of the
Peace, also continues to lead a variety of neighborhood improve-
ment efforts and serve as a voice for change."" Residents and
experts alike continue to question the utility of soil remediation
efforts, and relocation demands remain high.151The legacy of the
Coalition's decision to adopt a legal strategy remains, providing a
number of important lessons for attorneys, policy analysts, and
community organizers alike:
The Coalition evidenced a number of characteristics that
made it prone to increasing reliance on scientific testing and
evidence when it adopted a formal legal strategy. As atten-
tion shifted to scientific evidence, the use of resident stories
of health effects and long-term exposure diminished;
Organizational characteristics included fluid participation,
resource constraints, and an approach to data gathering and
problem definition which undercut the true value of resident
stories about cumulative exposure. These characteristics
interfered with or discouraged evaluation of the utility of
previous decisions;
149 The EPA selected the site for a Superfund Redevelopment Pilot, through which
$100,000 will be devoted to activities aimed at identifying community needs and ranking
potential future uses for the site. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Emergency
and Remedial Response, SUPERFUND REDEVELOPMENT PILOTS: RSR CORPORATION,
DALLAS, TX (July, 2000).
150 Sepulveda called for an independent audit of environmental health concerns in West
Dallas, a demand that has been echoed by the area's State Representative. Rick Klein,
Lingering Legacy: Residents Concerned Lead, its Effects will Remain After Smelter Disman-
tling, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 23, 2000, at 1 A. Sepulveda has also led numerous
neighborhood cleanup efforts in addition to his work with delinquent youths and educa-
tional initiatives. Volunteers Wanted for West Dallas Project, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 7, 2001, at 2Y (seeking volunteers for cleanup of the corner of Singleton Boulevard
and Bernal Drive); Metro Plus Briefs, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 24, 2001, at IY (men-
tions Sepulveda leading a cleanup of streets and alleys in the Cadillac Heights community).
151 Lingering Legacy, supra note 150 (citing concerns about attic dust in homes, grassy
areas between streets and sidewalks, and soil lead concentrations in yards neglected by the
EPA's sampling protocol, which results in a cleanup action only when an average of five
samples exceeds federal standards). An environmental lawyer, uninvolved in previous liti-
gation, is attempting to file a relocation lawsuit on behalf of thousands of residents, Id.
There is also movement on litigation against Intertek Testing Services Environmental Lab-
oratories for bypassing procedures needed to ensure reliable results of soil lead levels in
West Dallas. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Environmental And Natural Resources Division, For
Immediate Release (Sept. 21, 2000); Todd Bensman, Lab Fraud Trial to Proceed - Defense
* Denies Claims of Greed, Unreliable Testing of Pollutants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct.
10, 2001, at 23A.
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Historical processes, such as previous legal victories con-
cerning childhood lead poisoning, a decision to store con-
taminated soil at the RSR facility, and the declaration of a
Superfund site served to build a reliance on scientific ration-
ality and on evidence ill-suited for the airing of Coalition
member grievances.
Organizations are often responsible for shaping the long-run
paths traveled by their constituents. They facilitate interactions
within complex environments where the benefits of collective
behavior are multiplied. 152 At the same time, organizations can
produce unintended consequences through incentives that dictate
the kinds of coordinated behavior perceived to have the maximum
pay-off. Evidence from West Dallas suggests that informal envi-
ronmental justice organizations are susceptible to the coordination
of routines, trial-and-error learning, and lack of feedback mecha-
nisms that direct collective behavior down potentially sub-optimal
paths. These processes make it difficult for organizations to move
in different directions, particularly when tangible benefits are evi-
dent to legal representatives (i.e., value-added to the Walker case,
use of testing to initiate further litigation).
The increasing returns process described above progressed
through several stages, suggesting the importance of an organiza-
tion's characteristics and decision-making environment, as well as
the role of history. The importance of history is evident in the
development of alternative trajectories prior to the Coalition's
decision to litigate, including the use of scientific testing and cumu-
lative exposure stories by Coalition members. A period of crisis
following the EPA's decision to store lead-contaminated soil at the
RSR site led to a "critical juncture" where the Coalition decided to
proceed with a legal strategy. Critical junctures are periods, either
brief or extended, that produce distinct legacies.) 53 They produce
increasing returns in that a critical juncture period establishes one
or more distinct trajectories that are maintained and followed. A
historical trajectory, such as reliance on scientific evidence, is
established as a functional alternative that fulfills a group need.154
Beyond this point, the functional alternative, created by previous
152 Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL
AND THEORETICAL ECON. 11. (1993).
153 RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA 27
(1991). See also Andrew Abbott, On the Concept of Turning Point, 16 CoMP. Soc.
RESEARCH 85, 88-95 (1997).
154 ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES 103-106 (1968).
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historical causes, becomes its own cause, resulting in a selective
maintenance of organizational structures amenable to its continued
existence. 1 55
While historic processes were vital in the creation of multiple
paths from which one trajectory was established, the learning and
adaptive behavior styles evidenced within the Coalition suggest
that organizational characteristics and client expectations served to
reinforce the increasing returns process that followed. Internal
reinforcement of the use of litigation was facilitated by the organi-
zation's use of trial-and-error learning and lack of continued orga-
nizational search for alternative strategies. Trial-and-error learning
encourages increasing returns as group members improve their
competencies with frequently used procedures.1 56 Knowledge of
the success of previous litigation, for instance, can lead an organi-
zation to accumulate more experience with it, decreasing the likeli-
hood that it will have sufficient experience with superior
procedures to make them rewarding. The coordination of mem-
bers to the expected benefits of scientific testing decreased the
Coalition's search for other routines. Resource constraints also
heightened reliance on legal representation and discouraged the
proper evaluation of negative feedback regarding its utility. The
Coalition lacked sufficient resources and communications channels
to keep track of its changing membership or to apply their talents
to various means of meeting organizational objectives. Participants
varied in the amount of time and effort that they could contribute
to the Coalition, and defined group objectives differently (for
example, the order of importance for soil remediation, resident
relocation, and comprehensive planning changes varied from mem-
ber to member and across time). Groups with the above resource
constraints tend to focus on the allocation of attention in terms of
the amount of time that members devote to various tasks, as
opposed to the monetary allocation concerns of more formal orga-
nizations.1 57 Changing patterns of available time and energy will
influence an organization's investment in and continuance with one
over a set of competing historical trajectories. 58 When transaction
costs in the form of time allocated are significant, or when informa-
155 Id. at 105.
156 See Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REV. OF
Soc. 319, 322 (1988).
157 See Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17
ADMIN. ScI. Q. 1, 2 (1972).
158 Id. at 1.
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tion feedback regarding the appropriateness of chosen trajectories
is fragmentary at best, even potentially inefficient decisions will be
reinforced.
External reinforcement from government and legal assistance
agencies amenable to scientific testing and evidence also contrib-
uted to the increasing returns process. For the Coalition, increas-
ing returns in the form of expected benefits from the use of
scientific evidence was heightened by an existing infrastructure of
EPA regulations and norms of civil procedure. Risk assessment
procedures endorsed by the EPA privileged efforts to focus on the
present toxicity of soil to be excavated and "current site risk,"
rather than indicators of cumulative exposure to lead and other
toxins by residents. Legal representatives, rationally seeking to
bolster the effectiveness of their claims, also focused on tried and
true methods of exposing resident harm. Blood lead level testing
and other techniques were effectively employed, although they
failed to capture the totality of resident experiences and demands.
Client expectations also appear to have played a vital role in dis-
rupting the increasing returns process in the late 1990's, allowing a
new equilibrium to emerge. As stated, the Coalition's primary allo-
cation resource was attention in the form of time increments
devoted to various tasks. The problem with time in a situation that
requires its investment is that there are "no natural points of deci-
sion about whether to continue that line of investment.' 1 59 Com-
munity organizations whose primary responsibility is to allocate
time are more prone to overcommitment to a strategy as they have
no objective criteria for measuring the effectiveness of time com-
mitted or when time has begun to prove more useful if shifted to
other tasks. In order to avoid such a psychological trap, it is neces-
sary to encourage periodic appraisal of a process in which time is
invested."1 Decisions external to the Coalition in the late 1990s,
such as the deletion of residential neighborhoods from the
National Priorities List or the dismissal of the Coalition's CER-
CLA claims, provided such a means of appraisal. These events
marked the first real opportunity for the Coalition to compare time
159 DEAN G. PRUrrr & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALE-
MATE, AND SETTLEMENT 124 (1986); See generally, Jeffrey Z. Rubin et al., Factors Affecting
Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: The Importance of Timing, 16 J. OF RES. IN PERSONAL-
ITY 247, 255'(1982); Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of
Action: Toward Theoretical Progress, 17 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 39 (1992) (provides an
overview of the factors which can encourage an escalation of commitment, including cogni-
tive, interpersonal, group-level, and organizational processes).
160 SOCIAL CONFLICT, supra note 159.
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invested in a legal strategy with a lack of associated benefits. Prior
to these events, local residents could not as easily contrast expecta-
tions of perceived benefits from litigation with time commitments
devoted to a legal strategy. Environmental lawyers should con-
sider their role in ensuring the ability of client-organizations to
conduct evaluations of their investments of limited resources in a
litigation process, through the maintenance of social networks and
communication between and among group members and their
attorneys.
The increasing returns process 16' experienced by the Coalition is
illustrated below:
FIGURE 1. INCREASING RETURNS PROCESS FOR THE WEST
DALLAS COALITION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE.
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NPL deletion
Dismissal of
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Critical claims
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As environmental justice organizations adopt legal strategies
throughout the country, the present research suggests that the
incentives for doing so are many and varied. While the choice of
161 This process is an adaptation of the Critical Juncture Framework developed in COL-
LIER & COLLIER, supra note 153, at 30.
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litigation by the West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice
has yielded a number of positive outcomes for local residents,
cumulative exposure and the need for resident relocation, two of
the driving forces behind the initial building of social networks in
1989-90, remain unaddressed. The compromising of strategies such
as long-term exposure stories by an increasing returns process
accounts for much of the variation in the "secondary effects" of the
lawsuit. As legal scholars and local activists debate the utility of
legal claims, the case of the West Dallas Coalition suggests that
failure to consider the characteristics of client organizations, their
expectations, or the paths that they could traverse prior to the
adoptiqn of a legal strategy may prove irresponsible at best.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 2. OVERVIEW OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE.
Potential
Case Cause of Action Remedy Outcome
Harrisburg Coali- Proposed highways denied Sought to Civil rights claims denied due
lion Against Ruin- black residents equal opportu- enjoin to insufficient evidence of
ing the Env't v. nities to housing and recrea- construc- either discriminatory intent or
Volpe, 330 F.Supp. lion. Siting of highways tion of impact. Parties entered into
918. 932 (M.D. Pa. through a park motivated by the two an amicable settlement,
1971). the predominant use of the highways. whereby highways were
park by black residents. realigned.
Bean v. Southwest- Proposed solid waste disposal Sought to Denied preliminary injunction
ern Waste Manage- facility near a predominantly enjoin sit- because statistical data did
ment Corp., 482 black neighborhood and ing of the not prove that siting decision
F.Supp. 673, 676- within 1700 feet of a high solid was made on the basis of
81(S.D. Tex. 1979), school was part of a pattern waste dis- race.
affd, 780 F.2d 1038 and practice of discriminatory posal
(5th Cir. 1986) siting, facility.
NAACP v. Gor- Siting of a PCB disposal facil- Sought Denied. "Little likelihood
such, No. 82-768- ity in the county with the prelimi- that plaintiffs will prevail on
CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. highest percentage minority nary the merits." No evidence that
1982), cited in residents in North Carolina injunctive race was the motivating factor
Maura L. Tierney, violates the 14th Amendment. relief, in official decision making.
Comment, Environ-
mental Justice and
Title IV Challenges
to Permit Decisions:
The EPA's Interim
Guidance. 48 CATI.
U. L. Ripv. 1277,
1279 (1999)
Lever v. Rapp, 760 City manager and public Sought No grounds for construing
F.2d 280 (6th Cir. works director of Flint, MI injunctive actions as intentional discrimi-
1985). engaged in conspiratorial pol- relief, nation; city met federal air
icy to allow pollution from a pollution standards prior to
GMC plant to disproportion- established deadlines (includ-
ately harm residents of ing St. Johns area).
predominantly black housing
project (St. Johns neighbor-
hood).
Terry Properties, Residential developers of 30 Sought Most claims disposed of
Inc. v. Standard Oil single-family homes and six injunctive through summary judgment;
Co., 799 F.2d 1523, apartment buildings claim that and no evidence of discriminatory
1533-36 (11th Cir. the location of an industrial declara- intent; as private actors, liabil-
1986). plant adjacent to their prop- tory ity for 14th Amendment vio-
erty and rerouting of a road relief; lation only through conspiracy
violated the 14th Amendment. compen- with state actors.
satory
and puni-
tive dam-
ages.
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TAnI.E 2. CONTINUED
Potential
Case Cause of Action Remedy Outcome
East Bibb Twiggs Local zoning board decision Sought to Denied. Evidence of dispa-
Neighborhood to permit the location of a enjoin the rate impact relied on deci-
Ass'n v. Macon- privately owned landfill in granting sions of local authorities other
Bibb County Plan- predominantly black commu- of a con- than zoning board. No evi-
ning and Zoning nity motivated by considera- ditional dence of racial animus pro-
Comm'n, 706 tions of race, resulting in use per- vided.
F.Supp. 880, 887 denial of substantive/procedu- mit for
(M.D. Ga. 1989), ral due process, a taking with- non-
affd, 896 F. 2d out just compensation, and putresci-
1264, 1267 (11th denial of equal protection of ble waste
Cir. Nov. 30, 1989). the law. landfill.
Bordeaux Action Improper operation and over- Sought Denied.
Comm'n. v. Metro. sight of a garbage dump in a prelimi-
Nashville. No. 390- 70% black community vio- nary
0214 (M.D. Tenn. lated the equal protection injunc-
1990), cited in Luke clause of the 14th Amend- tion.
W. Cole, Corre- ment.
spondence, Reme-
dies for
Environmental
Racism: A View
From the Field, 90
MiciI. L. REv.
1991. 1992 (1992).
El Pueblo Para El Siting of a toxic waste inciner- Sought Dismissed on grounds of ripe-
Aire y Agua ator in a predominantly injunctive ness (CWM did not have all
Limpio v. Chemical Latino farmworker commu- relief, required permits); due process
Waste Management, nity furthered CWM's pattern violation claim held in absten-
No. CV-F-91-578- and practice of siting incinera- tion pending final judgment in
OWW (E.D. Cal. tors in communities of color related case.
1991), cited in Luke nationwide.
W. Cole, Corre-
spondence, Reme-
dies for
Environmental
Racism: A View
From the Field, 90
Mici. L. REV.
1991, 1992 (1992).
R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Siting of regional landfill in a Sought to Denied. Equal protection
Kay, 768 F.Supp. majority black neighborhood enjoin the clause does not impose an
1144, 1149-50 (E.D. in addition to the operation of siting of affirmative duty to equalize
Va. 1991), affd, 977 the county's three garbage the the impact of official decisions
F.2d 573 (4th Cir. dumps in predominantly black regional on different racial groups.
1992). areas marked a deprivation of landfill.
14th Amendment rights.
Bowman v. City of Installation of a sewer line Sought District Court dismissed all
Franklin, 980 F.2d through the Bowmans' prop- injunctive counts: Appeals Court
1104, 1110 (7th Cir. erty marked a violation of and mon- affirmed.
1992). 14th Amendment rights. etary
relief.
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TAInII 2. CON[iNUIED)
Potential
Case Cause of Action Remedy Outcome
Rozar v. Mullis, 85 Racial discrimination (rejec- Sought Denied due to time-barred
F.3d 556, 565 (11 th tion of other sites due to damages, nature of the claim (equal
Cir. 1996). white protests, addition of site prelimi- protection claim accrued when
in question to list despite nary and plaintiffs knew or should have
unsuitable land characteristics, perma- known about the siting deci-
voting by all-white majority) nent sion); two year limitation
in the siting and permitting of injunction period applied.
a solid waste landfill furthered of solid
a pattern and practice of plac- waste
ing landfills in minority areas landfill.
TABLE 3. TITLE VI ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LITIGATION.
Potential
Case Cause of Action Remedy Outcome
Coalition of Con- Construction of an extension Declara- Defendants presented non-dis-
cerned Citizens to Interstate 670 would have a tory and criminatory reasons for loca-
Against 1-670 v. disproportionate impact on injunctive tion; injunction until
Damian, 608 minority citizens of Columbus; relief, compliance with public
F.Supp. 110, 129 failed to involve the public, involvement requirements.
(S.D. Ohio 1984).
North Carolina Extension of East-West Free- Injunctive DOT informed the state that
DOT v. Crest St. way would destroy much of a relief, construction would constitute
Community Coun- predominantly black commu- a Title VI violation; negoti-
cil. Inc., 479 U.S. 6, nity including its park and ated settlement rerouted free-
8, 9, i (1986). church, leaving isolated sec- way.
tors likely to undergo com-
mercial development.
Clean Air Alterna- Siting of a freeway in Oak- Injunctive Settled.
tives Coalition v. land, California would have a relief.
U.S. DOT, No. C- more negative impact on Afri-
93-0721-URW (N.D. can-American neighborhoods.
Cal. 1993).
Chester Residents Issuance of solid waste facility Injunctive District Court found no pri-
Concerned for permit in predominantly black relief. vate right of action; Appeals
Quality Living v. community marks the fifth Court held private right
Seif, 132 F.3d 925, waste facility permit for existed; state revoked permit
937 (3rd Cir. 1997). Chester since 1987. at issue.
NAACP-Flint v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Injunctive Civil rights claim dismissed;
Engler, 456 Mich. Resources' approval of permit relief, plaintiffs moved for rehearing.
919 (1997). for Genesee Power Station Application for leave to
violated Title VI. appeal denied.
476
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TABmI-, 3, CONTINUFE)
Potential
Case Cause of Action Remedy Outcome
South Bronx Coali- Proposed de-inking facility Injunctive Denied: must establish that
tion for Clean Air (36 acres) in Harlem River relief, injunction necessary to pre-
v. Conroy, 20 Yard and expansion of waste vent irreparable harm, is
F.Supp. 2d 565, 573 transfer facility will create dis- likely to succeed on the mer-
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). parate impact of noxious its.
effects of garbage on minority
residents of the South Bronx.
Bryant v. New Siting of a highway and tun- Injunctive Defendant motions to dismiss
Jersey Dep't of nel through predominantly relief. (sovereign immunity and state
Transp., I F.Supp. black neighborhood would eminent domain) denied; case
2d 426 (D.N.J. -require condemnation and on-going.
1998). cause flooding, noise, and
traffic, constituting a disparate
impact.
Goshen Road Siting of a wastewater treat- Prelimi- Summary judgment affirmed
Envtl. Action Team ment facility in a predomi- nary and for defendants; no violation of
v. U.S. Dept. of nantly black neighborhood perma- Title VI where nondiscrimina-
Agric., No. 98-2102 violated Title VI and NEPA. nent tory reason exists for a deci-
(4th Cir. 1999). injunc- sion.
tion.
Tolbert v. Ohio ODOT discriminated against Equitable District Court's dismissal due
Department of the residents of Cherrywood relief, to statute of limitations
Transportation, 172 apartment complex (predomi- reversed; case on-going.
F.3d 934, 936 (6th nantly black) in its allocation
Cir. 1999). of highway sound barriers.
New York City City initiative to sell or Prelimi- Plaintiffs properly alleged
Environmental Jus- destroy 1100 city-owned par- nary irreparable harm but failed to
tice Alliance v. Giu- cels comprising 600 commu- injunc- demonstrate a likelihood of
liani, 50 F.Supp. 2d nity gardens will have a tion. success on the merits. Motion
250, 255 (S.D.N.Y. disparate impact on black/ denied.
1999), afd, 214 Latino communities.
F.3d 65 (2d Cir.
2000).
Jersey Heights Siting of a new highway adja- Injunctive Title VI claim is time-barred
Neighborhood cent to predominantly black relief. (court applied the state of
Ass'n v. Glenden- neighborhood would have a Maryland's personal injury
ing, 174 F.3d 180, disparate impact on the com- limitations period of three
194 (4th Cir. 1999). munity; DEIS/FEIS ignored years to the claim); reversed
SES data and impacts; inade- District Court's dismissal of
quate notice of public meet- Association's NEPA chal-
ings. lenges.
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MAP OF WEST DALLAS
Operation Unit 1 includes almost all of the area displayed.
Operation Unit 3 includes other slag piles to the west of the area shown.
Boundaries are approximate and are intended to show the general location of operable units.
